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ABSTRACT
A comprehensive literature review was undertaken in order to define and assess
the sustainability and resiliency characteristics associated with grass-based and
confinement dairy farming. Primarily as a result of reduced input costs, grass-based dairy
farming often enhances profitability over confinement systems, especially on small
farms. Further, conversion of tilled soil to permanent pasture has been shown to
significantly reduce harmful sediment and nutrient transport into waterways. Perennial
forage also acts as a carbon sink, curtailing or even negating a grass-based farm’s carbon
footprint. Finally, social benefits derived from enhanced nutrition and higher quality of
life are also associated with grass-based dairy farming. Given that policy goals of the
State of Vermont include both bolstering farm viability and reducing farm-related runoff,
two questions are then raised. What is the most effective way to incentivize the adoption
of rotational grazing in Vermont? And what types of farms are best suited to its use?
A series of interviews with dairy experts and farmers was conducted as a
preliminary investigation into these questions. This qualitative evidence suggested that
farmers generally adopted grass-based dairying after observing a peer’s success with the
method, suggesting that a key leverage point may be peer-based learning.
A behavioral economics game was developed to evaluate the role of peer
networks in facilitating decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. A computerized
game platform simulated networks of small dairy farm enterprises, with participants
acting as farm managers. Treatments varied the size of peer networks, as well as the
inclusion of a perfectly-performing automated “seed player.” Participants could base their
decisions upon the successes of their peers. They received a cash incentive based on their
farms’ performance. Results indicated that players with higher numbers of peers made
better economic decisions on average. The inclusion of a “seed player” within a network,
which modeled the ideal behavior, also facilitated better decision-making. Both of these
correlations were statistically significant. Furthermore, the shape of the “diffusion curve”
of new adoptees confirmed literature on the dynamics of innovation diffusion. Public
policy implications from this work include an increased focus on facilitating peer-to-peer
learning among farmers where Best Management Practice adoption is a policy goal.
To further evaluate the potential for peer learning to facilitate positive change, the
Dairy Farm Transitions Agent Based Model (DFTABM) was developed. The model was
calibrated using existing datasets along with the qualitative and quantitative results
described above. It forecasts effects on farm profitability, attrition, and soil loss arising
from varying assumptions about peer network connectivity, peer emulation,
macroeconomic trends, and agri-environmental policy. Nine experimental treatments
were assessed. Overall, it was found that high rates of emulation coupled with high rates
of connectivity—especially targeted connectivity among smaller farms—yielded the best
balance of farm viability and reduction in soil loss. The establishment of a performancebased tax credit had no clear correlation with the resulting soil loss figures predicted by
the model. Policy implications from this study include the finding that direct payment
schemes for reduction in environmental harm may not always have their intended effects,
whereas policies that enhance peer-to-peer learning opportunities, especially among the
proprietors of smaller farms, may present an effective and relatively affordable means by
which to bolster farm profitability while also reducing environmental degradation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, PROJECT OVERVIEW, AND LITERATURE
REVIEW

1.1. Introduction
1.1.1. Grass-Based Dairy Farming: A Primer
Over the past several decades, the economic squeeze of higher feed costs and
lower milk prices has prompted dairy farmers to adapt and experiment with new ways to
maintain profitability. Many farmers have followed the “get big or get out” path, buying
extra land to produce more feed, increasing the size of their milking herds, implementing
the latest science-based animal nutrition, and harnessing economies of scale to maintain
profitability despite diminishing per-animal returns (USDA NASS, 1992b; 1997b; 1997c;
2002b; 2002c; 2007b; 2007c; 2012b; 2012c). Other farmers have focused on cost cutting
rather than production volume maximization. One way this has been actualized is
through a renaissance in pasture- or grass-based production methods. Managing cattle on
perennial forages requires something of a paradigm shift in land use management and
planning, but agricultural economists and early adopters have demonstrated that in many
cases, well-managed grass-based systems are a viable alternative to confinement
dairying.
A great deal of research has been conducted on the economic, ecological, and
social benefits associated with grass-based agriculture. A common theme that emerges
from the literature is that a specialized system of pasture management known as
rotational grazing offers significant productivity advantages over continuous grazing,
while also providing important ecosystem services (Murphy, 2002). Research shows that
1

dairy farmers who use rotational grazing are more likely to maintain steady
profitability—even at the smaller scale of many traditional family farms—and report
higher average levels of success and satisfaction than do confinement farmers (Dartt et al,
1999; Winsten, Parsons, & Hanson, 2000; Kriegl, 2001; 2005; Conneman et al., 2006;
Hanson et al., 2009; Benson, 2009; Colby, 2012; Karszes et al., 2012). Additionally,
cultivating perennial forages in place of row crops has the potential to sharply cut or even
reverse net greenhouse gas emissions, while also stabilizing soil and reducing the
quantity of phosphorus, nitrogen, and sediment that runs off into waterways (Conant et
al., 2001; Six et al., 2002; Guo and Gifford, 2002; Gilker, 2005; Rotz et al., 2009; 2010;
Schwarte et al., 2011). Finally, hillsides dotted with grazing cows epitomize the look and
feel of traditional working landscapes, and flourishing small family farms are a boon to
rural community development (Donham et al, 2007; Lyson et al, 2001). As a result of
logistical challenges, switching to rotational grazing will not be feasible for all dairy
farmers, but where possible, it has been suggested that grass-based dairying—specifically
the use of rotational grazing—should be considered an environmental Best Management
Practice (BMP) for dairy production (Gilker, 2005). Details about the sustainability and
resiliency characteristics of grass-based and confinement dairy production will be
discussed at length in Section 1.3 below.
1.1.2. If It’s So Great, Why Isn’t Everyone Doing It?
Despite its potential advantages, as of 2006, only 13% of northeast U.S. dairy
producers were using rotational grazing (Winsten et al., 2011). To understand why more
dairy managers have not switched from confinement dairying to grass-based methods
2

will require an inquiry into farmers’ motivations and decision-making patterns. A
number of studies have suggested perceived barriers which prevent farmers from
adopting BMPs in general, and grass-based dairying in particular (Winsten et al., 2011b;
Zia, 2014). In these studies, factors such as uncertainty and a perceived lack of control
over outcomes emerge as the strongest barriers to adoption. If increased adoption of
grass-based dairy farming is to be a policy goal, policy interventions will need to build on
existing knowledge about perceived barriers, while also introducing systematic
stakeholder input and rigorous analysis to determine which policy options may represent
effective and efficient uses of public resources.
1.1.3. Why Study Dairy in Vermont?
The State of Vermont represents an excellent case study to assess both dairy
industry production trends and agri-environmental public policy interventions. Dairy
accounts for the large majority—about 70-80%—of Vermont’s annual agricultural
revenue, and despite its small size, the state’s 135,000 milkers produce enough milk to
position Vermont at 16th in the nation for overall dairy production. But despite everincreasing milk production—both per cow and aggregated to the state level—many
Vermont dairy farms teeter on the brink of economic failure. Whereas in 1965 there were
over 6000 operating dairy farms in Vermont, the latest census figures indicate that as of
2012 only 934 farms were still selling milk, with the rate of attrition in the industry
showing no signs of slowing (Parsons, 2010; USDA NASS, 2012d).
While farm profitability and viability are certainly worthy policy goals, it is
important to realize that agriculture impinges upon more than just Vermont’s bottom line;
3

in fact, agricultural production represents less than 2% of Vermont’s total GDP
(Altendorfer et al., 2010). It is the multifunctional nature of agriculture (Boody et al.,
2005)—its impacts upon Vermont’s working landscape, rural communities, and natural
environment—that make farming in general, and dairy farming in particular, such a
cornerstone issue in Vermont politics. The recent political wrangling over efforts by
environmental regulators to clean up Lake Champlain—which have pinpointed dairy
farming as a major nonpoint source of Phosphorus runoff—is a case in point (State of
Vermont, 2014). Vermont policymakers must grapple not only with the economic
aspects of dairy farming, but how it affects the State’s commitment to healthy
communities, environmental sustainability, and other key policy goals.
Structurally, Vermont’s dairy industry is marked by somewhat smaller than
average farms, averaging 125 cows, compared to the national average of 144 (USDA
NASS, 2012f). This is important because, in general, it is smaller dairy farms that have
been forced out of the industry in the face of mounting economic pressures (Parsons,
2010). As of 2010, about 11.5% of Vermont dairy farmers were using rotational grazing
as a primary feed source (Winsten, Parsons, & Hanson, 2000). This is in line with a 2006
figure of 13% using rotational grazing in the northeast U.S. region (Winsten et al., 2011),
but quite low when compared to a 1999 figure indicating that 21.8% of Wisconsin dairy
farmers use the technique (Undersander et al., 2014).
Due to Vermont’s twin agricultural policy goals of farm viability and agricultural
runoff reduction, as well as the structural characteristics of its dairy industry, the State
represents an excellent environment in which to pose questions concerning the future of
4

the dairy industry. Specifically, this study aims to uncover the conditions under which
farmers would—or would not—choose to adopt novel farm management practices like
rotational grazing, and to use that information to pinpoint smart public policy solutions
which address both farm viability and environmental sustainability.
1.1.4. Project Goals
The primary goals of this research project are:
1. To demonstrate through a comprehensive literature review that grass-based
dairying should be considered a Best Management Practice for many farmers
2. To determine the common factors underlying farmers’ decisions to switch to
grass-based dairy production, and the perceived barriers blocking its use
3. To identify public policy interventions which may effectively mitigate perceived
barriers by examining farmers’ motivations and decision-making strategies
4. To predict the effects of proposed policies upon dairy farm viability, state
finances, and key metrics of ecological sustainability

1.2. Project Overview
This project focuses on utilizing stakeholder input, experimental research, and
computational analysis to determine which public policy options would most-effectively
incentivize the use of grass-based dairy production. Qualitative data were collected in the
form of stakeholder interviews with dairy farmers and other dairy industry experts. An
original behavioral economics experiment was then undertaken to determine the
dynamics by which novel techniques such as BMPs may diffuse through peer networks.
5

These qualitative and quantitative data were combined with existing statistical datasets
using a Knowledge Management approach and used to calibrate an agent-based computer
model. The model forecasts likely results—at the level of one key Vermont watershed—
of user-input setup conditions pertaining to macroeconomic trends, farmer decisionmaking strategies, and public policies aimed at addressing agri-environmental goals.
This section gives a brief overview of the methods employed in this study; a
comprehensive methodological review will follow in Section 1.4.
1.2.1. Initial Expert Interviews
Semi-structured expert interviews were performed with agricultural economists
and dairy industry leaders in order to identify (a) what typologies of Vermont farmers
may benefit from switching to grass-based dairying, (b) barriers to switching to grassbased dairying faced by these farmers, (c) realistic policy incentives which may
overcome these barriers, and (d) individual farmers who may be available for in-depth
interviews. The initial expert input phase informed the creation of interview schedules to
be used in the structured farmer stakeholder interviews to follow.
1.2.2. Structured Farmer Interviews
Eight structured interviews were conducted during the summer of 2014. These
interviews were stratified across three farmer stakeholder groups: (a) farmers who are
successfully using rotational grazing; (b) farmers who are successfully using modern
confinement systems, and (c) farmers who at some point have transitioned between
confinement and grass-based dairy management. Standardized interview schedules were
created for each farmer typology. These schedules first posed a series of questions
6

concerning characteristics identified in the expert input phase which may influence the
choice to switch to rotational grazing, such as operator demographics, land attributes,
management attributes, economic data, and success/satisfaction. Next, the interviews
addressed perceived barriers to switching to rotational grazing, probable responses to
specific incentive programs designed to overcome those barriers, and, for farmers who
had personally made management transitions, factors underlying the choice to do so.
Results of this qualitative analysis were used to generate the structure of the behavioral
economics game, and used to inform the decision rules to be implemented in the agentbased model.
1.2.3. Behavioral Economics Experimentation
Results of qualitative interviews strongly suggested that learning from other
farmers, specifically concerning their peers’ management decisions and resultant levels
of financial success, played a major role in farmers’ decisions to switch production
methods. In order to rigorously analyze this observation, a multi-round social contagion
behavioral economics experiment was developed to ascertain whether the structure and
density of peer networks affects the adoption rate of ecologically-beneficial Best
Management Practices for farmers operating in a simulated agricultural commodity
market.
Participants were randomly selected from a cohort of University of Vermont
undergraduate volunteers, and were compensated based on the financial success of a
simple simulated farm enterprise over ten farming seasons. During each season, players
decided whether to adopt a new production method or maintain their current production
7

method. In order to replicate an environment of uncertainty, the financial outcomes of
these choices were not made directly available to participants, but they did have access to
the management choices and financial outcomes of one or more peers also playing the
game. Treatments varied primarily based on the peer network size, or degree, in order to
ascertain whether larger networks facilitated learning faster or more robustly than smaller
networks.
1.2.4. Agent-Based Computer Simulation
Because the prevalence of barriers and efficacy of public policies are likely to be
linked to multiple factors—such as farm typology characteristics, land use patterns,
geographic limitations of specific sites, peer connections between farmers, federal and
state tax and subsidy policies, and macroeconomic price trends for agricultural
products—optimizing overall state-level policy regarding dairy Best Management
Practices represents a complex, nonlinear problem: there are too many “cogs in the
wheel,” and their actions too closely intertwined, to be able to confidently predict causeand effect without the aid of advanced techniques. In order to assess the probable results
of proposed public policies upon complex systems, computational modeling can be a
valuable tool. Agent-based, Coupled Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) models
such as the one developed for this project can distill complex interactions between human
rationality, macroeconomic trends, and environmental conditions into simplified
projections which are relevant to policymakers and analysts.
The Dairy Farm Transitions Agent Based Model’s agents are initialized using a
series of functions to assign real-world farm characteristics based on statistical
8

distributions of farm typologies identified by USDA Census of Agriculture data. The
agents are then located within a Global Information System (GIS) environment based on
current land use data from the Vermont Center for Geographic Information. Partly to
save on computational requirements, the model’s environment is limited to Franklin
County, Vermont. This region was chosen because a key policy goal addressed by this
project is phosphorus loading of the Missisquoi River watershed, a major tributary of
Lake Champlain which is located primarily within Franklin County. Ecological and
economic effects of changing agricultural land use, including the use of grass-based
production and organic certification, were calibrated using data from peer-reviewed
academic studies and government reports. Calibration of the model’s economic
forecasting engine was performed by correlating model outcomes with trendlines
apparent in real-world data. County-level predictions are generated which indicate the
effect of changes in land use and farm management on farm viability and resiliency, milk
production, and levels of agricultural runoff. The model amalgamates current land use
data, farmland geographic factors, and probable farmer responses to policy incentives,
specifically those aimed at increasing the use of grass-based dairy production by
strengthening opportunities for peer-to-peer learning.
A setup screen allows the user to select the policies she wishes to implement, as
well as adjusting baseline assumptions such as feed and milk price trends, and agent
decision-making behavior. The model runs for several years, during which the farm
agents within the model react to economic conditions and policy incentives, making farm
management decisions based on heuristics codified from identified motivational attitudes
9

of actual farmers and participants in the behavioral economics simulations. Land-use
changes of individual farm agents, along with county-level economic and ecological
effects, are displayed in real time as the model runs. This model allows policymakers a
glimpse into the future in order to more accurately and wisely choose policy paths which
best utilize limited resources to accomplish agri-environmental policy aims.

1.3. Literature Review
1.3.1. Literature Review Overview
The purposes of this literature review are as follows:
1. To briefly address the history and current patterns of dairy farming in Vermont
2. To outline the basic distinctions between confinement and grass-based dairy
production, specifically focusing on the rotational grazing technique
3. To examine academic research on the benefits and drawbacks of each system
regarding key indicators of sustainability
4. To review current and proposed agri-environmental legislation in Vermont
5. To examine literature which addresses perceived and actual barriers to the
adoption of BMPs in general, and grass-based dairying in particular
6. To lay the methodological foundation under the research methods here proposed:
a. Qualitative interviews with expert informants and stakeholders
b. Behavioral economics of decision making under conditions of uncertainty
c. Knowledge Management
d. Agent-based computer modeling
10

1.3.2. Dairy Production in Vermont: History and Current Production Trends
Vermont has a rich agricultural history which has largely centered on the
production of animal-derived products. In the early 1800s, the forests were cleared for
lumber, and Vermont became home to thousands of sheep which grazed its hillsides.
Dairy production took over starting around the 1850s and has continued as the state’s
primary agricultural export to this day. Vermont was the dominant producer of milk,
butter, and cheese for east coast population centers throughout the late 19th and early
20th centuries, but economic pressures beginning in the 1950s began to take their toll on
Vermont’s small dairy operations, the majority of which have since folded (Parsons,
2010; Vermont Agency of Agriculture, 2014). The squeeze of volatile milk prices,
coupled with higher feed costs, has continued and even intensified in the 21st century.
Net earnings per hundredweight (CWT) of milk have fluctuated significantly in recent
decades, punctuated by periodic years in which net losses are reported across dairy
producers (VSJF, 2013: Figure 3.3.1). Factoring in the value of unpaid operator labor,
dairy profitability dropped every year between 1988 and 2004 (USDA, 2007). Smallerscale, traditional Vermont dairy farms are the most likely to fall prey to this cost-price
squeeze because many have not captured operational efficiencies associated with recent
developments in dairy management.
To remain profitable, farms must either increase in size, drawing their profits
from economies of scale and overall production volume, cut costs, find ways to sell their
milk for a higher price, or a combination of these approaches. The sections below
discuss two primary ways dairy farmers have adapted to maintain solvency in the face of
11

economic pressures: large modern confinement systems and grass-based rotationalgrazing systems. Both system typologies offer dairy farmers the opportunity to maintain
profitability in the face of significant economic challenges.
1.3.3. Definitions of Dairy Production Methods As Used in This Project
Confinement Dairying
Confinement dairying has been the dominant method of dairy farming since about
the middle of the 20th century. Nutrition on confinement farms is managed through the
formulation of a Total Mixed Ration (TMR), which generally includes corn silage and
haylage (both often produced on site), along with purchased protein supplements,
vitamins, and minerals. Cows are housed in either a stall barn (stanchion or comfort
stall), or increasingly a free stall setup, and milked either two or three times per day.
Cows on many confinement farms rarely if ever leave the barn: the TMR is delivered to a
feed bed, and waste is removed mechanically and stored for later use as fertilizer. While
most Vermont farms are much smaller, confinement farms can have milking herds of
well over 1000 cows. Advances in nutrition, better environmental conditions in barns,
and more frequent milking have increased yields on well managed confinement dairies.
Milk production per cow in a confinement system can be as high as 25,000 pounds per
year (Karszes et al., 2012).
Grass-Based Dairying
Grass-based dairy production relies on pasture forage for the majority of cows’
nutrition. Because overall caloric intake is lower and energy expenditure higher, cows
raised on pasture are generally milked only twice per day and produce up to 30% lower
12

milk yields than cows in a confinement operation (Kolver & Muller, 1998). It is
important to note that, due to Vermont’s winter season, year-round grass-based
production is not feasible. Vermont graziers’ average grazing season in 2010 began May
5th and ended November 13th (Colby, 2012).1 During the remainder of the year, cows are
fed hay, haylage, and silage produced on site; and/or purchased feed grain. A minority of
farmers dry their cows off in the winter and synchronize calving to resume milking in the
spring season in an effort to save on winter feed.
An Introduction to Rotational Grazing
Rotational grazing, variously called Management-Intensive Grazing (MIG),
Management-Intensive Rotational Grazing (MIRG), rational grazing, or short-term
grazing, is a method of grass-based livestock management which regulates the movement
of animals through a series of paddocks rather than turning them out on a single
continuous pasture. A French agronomist named Andre Voisin developed the principle
of rotational grazing, which he called “rational grazing,” in the late 1950s (Voisin, 1959).
Due to the herd’s frequent rotation from paddock to paddock, cows are afforded a steady
supply of grasses which are at their optimum growth point for bovine nutrition, rather
than becoming overgrazed in some spots and overgrown in others. Rotational grazing
also facilitates an even distribution of manure on the field and prevents soil compaction
from cows congregating in certain favorite areas (Murphy, 2002). For these reasons,
rotational grazing offers livestock managers significant advantages over continuous
pasturing.

1

This figure is for all pasture-raised animals in Vermont. The grazing season for dairy cows may
be somewhat shorter, depending on weather and pasture management techniques.
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Efficiently managing a grass-based system requires an intimate knowledge of
grass species, regrowth timing, and nutritional content of pasture forage at different
points in the growth cycle. Grasses must be grazed at the vegetative stage before they go
to seed for optimum nutritional value. To ensure even grazing, cows must be moved at a
minimum every three days, although the best managers may move their cows daily or
even multiple times per day (Colby, 2012). Plants re-bitten after three days may have
already started to regrow and will therefore suffer longer-term damage, resulting in less
overall forage production. Despite its somewhat technical nature, rotational grazing has
the potential to produce much more forage from a given area of land than continuous
grazing, and therefore represents a smart management choice where pasture forage is to
be used as a primary feed source (Murphy, 2002).
Grass-Based Dairying in Vermont
Much of Vermont’s land was once cleared to accommodate grazing animals, but
around the mid-20th century, grazing gradually fell out of favor as confinement dairying
became the norm. In recent years, grass-based agriculture has enjoyed a resurgence as
farmers have searched for ways to cut costs associated with corn silage production and
feed grain purchases. The acreage of permanent pastureland in Vermont shows a
corresponding jump from 6.6% of total agricultural land in 1997 to 11.2% as of 2012
(USDA NASS, 1997d; 2012e). While only 11.5% of Vermont’s dairy farms use
rotational grazing as a primary feed source, continuous pasturing is common on
Vermont’s traditional dairies, with more than 47% of farmers employing grazing to some
extent, often for dry cows, heifers, and feeder calves (Winsten, Parsons, & Hanson, 2000;
14

Parsons, 2003). In his 1831 book, A History of the State of Vermont, Nathan Hoskins
observed of the state, “The soil is such and the seasons are so uncertain for the perfection
of crops of grain, that grazing is the most sure and profitable branch of agriculture which
the farmer of Vermont can carry on with success” (Hoskins, 1831). Despite advances in
agricultural technology, we shall see that Hoskins’ statement still largely rings true to this
day.
1.3.4. Sustainability and Resilience of Dairy Production Systems: The “Three
Legged Stool” Model
There exist a number of disparate bodies of literature related to the ecological,
economic, and social benefits of managed grasslands in general and grass-based dairy in
particular. These three elements make up the “three legged stool” model of
sustainability. This project takes a transdisciplinary stance, weaving together established
research in farm management, agricultural economics, plant and soil sciences, natural
resource ecology, rural sociology, and nutrition and food science to address systems-level
impacts of the two dairy production paradigms laid out above on key indicators of
sustainability and resiliency.
Economic Sustainability
For a farm to be economically sustainable, it must at the very least be solvent, and
ideally be profitable enough to comfortably support its proprietors. Agricultural
economists have undertaken a number of case studies and experiments looking into the
profitability of grass-based vs. confinement dairy production. A retrospective cohort
study by Dartt et al. (1999) indicated that Michigan dairies using rotational grazing
15

captured more profit on average than conventionally-managed dairy farms. Data from
Cornell University’s Dairy Farm Business Summary and Analysis Project indicated that
grazing farms in New York averaged a net income of $467 per cow annually, whereas
confinement farms averaged $365. The additional profits were driven by lower operating
costs, fewer feed purchases, decreased machinery costs, lower veterinary bills, and other
factors (Benson, 2009). An economic analysis of over 100 rotational grazing farms in the
great lakes region concluded that graziers had higher Net Farm Income from Operations
(NFIFO) both per cow and per CWT than did their confinement counterparts.
Interestingly, graziers with fewer than 100 cows had the highest level of NFIFO per cow
(Kriegl, 2005).
Hanson et al. (2013) analyzed the tax returns of 62 dairy farmers milking 200 or
fewer cows from the mid-Atlantic region of the U.S. over a 15 year period. Their
research revealed that operators using rotational grazing were more profitable than their
counterparts using confinement methods based on a number of indicators of
profitability. The profits of grazing operations were also less volatile, meaning that these
farms faced less risk and operated with more certainty in the marketplace. In light of
grass-based operations’ established environmental benefits, especially concerning erosion
and nutrient runoff, the authors concluded that greater environmental regulations upon
dairy farms may further increase the attractiveness of grass-based dairying in the future.
Gillespie et al. (2009) assessed 1815 responses from 24 states to the 2005
Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) administered by the National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the United Sates Department of Agriculture
16

Economic Research Service (USDA ERS). Data from this survey were weighted so that
results could be accurately extended to the overall national commercial dairy
sector. Researchers used regression analysis to correlate farm characteristics with
measures of both dairy enterprise and whole-farm profitability. They found that
conventional and semi-pasture based farms were larger and produced more milk per cow,
but also had higher debt to asset ratios than fully pasture-based operations. While
conventional farms had higher dairy enterprise returns, fully pasture-based operations
proved the most profitable on a whole-farm basis, which includes factors such as
opportunity costs for unpaid labor and land, revealing that pasture-based farmers may
have more free time and resources to devote to other profitable activities.
Based on 1999 survey data of 124 Connecticut dairy farms sampled across all
sizes and production methods, Foltz and Lang (2005) used economic modeling to
determine how a farmer’s decision to adopt rotational grazing would affect measures of
cost, production, and profit. Overall, adoption of rotational grazing did not statistically
correlate with changes in milk production per cow, cost of production, or profit. The
results did show, however, that full adoption of rotational grazing resulted in greater
profitability than partial adoption.
It is important to note that there is great variability in the data on dairy farm
profitability. While grazing farms may have demonstrable economic advantages in some
contexts, many variables affect profitability, and well-managed systems of both types can
be profitable (Kriegl, 2001). It is also important to recognize that transitioning from one
production system to another will likely give rise to significant transitional costs as the
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systems require somewhat different equipment, knowledge, and possibly livestock
breeds. At the end of the day, the literature clearly demonstrates that grass-based dairy
farms are an economically-viable alternative to modern confinement operations for many
farmers, and especially so for farmers whose operations are too small to compete on size
alone.
At its core, profitability in dairy production is a direct function of input costs,
milk price, and milk production. The following sections will therefore examine each
factor in turn to see how grass-based and confinement-based production systems stack
up. The final section will look at how these factors influence the risk and resiliency
associated with each system.
Input Cost
One of the main economic advantages to rotational grazing systems over both
traditional dairies and large modern confinement operations is cost savings. A 2005
comparison of rotational grazing vs. non-grazing farms in New York revealed per-cow
cost savings on labor, purchased feed, medicine, and machinery; as well as reduced crop
production expenses per hundredweight (Conneman et al., 2006).
i.

Labor:
Savings in hired labor costs on rotational grazing farms were driven by farm

scale, less labor-intensive feed production, and less frequent milking. Labor is generally
a larger component of total expenses on larger farms because primary operator and
family labor must be supplemented with hired labor. Large confinement operations had
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the highest labor costs of any dairy production system, estimated at about $2.82 per
hundredweight in 2012 (Karszes et al., 2012).
ii.

Feed:
Feed represents the largest cost on most dairy farms. Research shows that feed

costs are lowest on rotational grazing farms, but the data reveal important differences
between specific grazing practices. When comparing farms which report any form of
pasture use to those that do not, a significant difference in feed costs is not reported
(Kriegl, 2005). However, reduced feed production and purchase costs are observed on
farms which use rotational grazing techniques. An analysis of farm enterprise budgets
concluded that rotational grazing systems experienced the lowest direct costs per unit of
equivalent nutritional value when compared with hay or corn-silage cropping programs
(Hanson, 1995). In the northeast, feed savings on grass-based farms were driven largely
by reduced production of corn: 12 of 41 grazing farms polled by the 2006 Cornell Dairy
Business Summary did not grow a corn silage crop at all, whereas the average forage
production across grazing farms was about one quarter corn and three quarters hay.
Large confinement farms, on the other hand, grew about equal ratios of corn and hay
(Conneman et al., 2005). In Vermont, farms employing grazing of any type grew an
average of 0.97 acres of corn per cow, whereas confinement-based operations averaged
1.22 acres per cow (Parsons et al, 2004).
It is important to consider the within-group differences between the rotational
grazing farms and the other farms represented in these data which use grazing only in
certain circumstances. While farms that graze only their dry cows and heifers, for
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example, probably spend about the same percent of their budget on feed production as
large confinement farms, the 25% of grazing farms in the 2005 Conneman et al. study
which grew no corn at all likely had significantly reduced feed production costs. This
helps explain why rotational grazing farms have been shown to achieve high profitability,
while traditional small farms which use grazing to some extent but do not manage their
pastures for optimum forage yield do not (Foltz and Gillis, 2005). Farms that use
grazing, but do not manage their pastures using rotational grazing, will probably still be
reliant on significant amounts of corn silage or purchased grain feed.
An additional consideration is the high variability in feed grain prices over the last
decade (Thraen and McNew, 2007). Since 2006, incentive programs for corn ethanol
production at the national level have both raised the price of corn and increased price
volatility, with prices ranging from a low of $2.20 per bushel in 2006 to a high of $5.17
in 2008 (Parsons, 2010). As discussed in the resiliency section below, this feed cost
variability may have negative impacts on long-term farm viability.
iii.

Fuel:
While fuel does not represent a primary cost of dairy farming as do feed and

labor, a large differential has been reported between the fuel use of typical grass-based
farms and typical confinement-based farms. This savings is driven mainly by the
equipment-intensive nature of corn silage production. The University of Wisconsin’s
Center for Dairy Profitability estimates fuel costs of $29.01 per acre to raise corn silage,
versus only $4.81 per acre to manage a perennial pasture, including one cut of hay
(Center for Dairy Profitability, 2008). In Vermont, it is very likely that more than one cut
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of hay would be required on most grass-based dairies, which would increase the actual
cost per acre to some extent. Nevertheless, it is probable that there is generally at least
some degree of fuel savings associated with grass-based dairying.
Milk Price
i.

Historical Milk Price Trends
In 2011, organic milk sold at the farm gate for an average price of $30.64 per

CWT, while the price for conventional milk averaged $20.93 per CWT (Maltby, 2013).
While the price of conventional and organic milk both show upward trends over the past
half century, the most significant trend in milk prices is the increasing intensity of cyclic
price fluctuations over the last 20 years (Gould, 2015b). In the case of conventional milk,
in particular, these price cycles, peaking roughly every three years, have become quite
drastic: as of 2013, the coefficient of variation for the 5-year moving average of U.S.
conventional farm gate milk prices was nearly 18%, whereas organic milk varied by only
about 6% over the same time period (Su & Cook, 2015). A similar analysis reveals that,
between 2004 and 2012, annual price change for conventional milk ranged from -23% to
52%, whereas organic milk prices changed only -4% to 10% per year (Su, 2013). For
farmers operating on tight margins, these fluctuations can create a “cost price squeeze”
which may significantly impact farm viability.
ii.

Product Differentiation and Value-Added Products
Organic dairy certification now requires that cows receive at least 30% of their

nutrition from pasture during a minimum 120-day grazing season (USDA Organic,
2011). Coupling grass-based production with organic certification may represent a way
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to earn higher returns per unit of milk without purchasing a great deal of expensive
organic feed. Many Vermont farms have taken advantage of the added value associated
with certifying organic, with the number of certified organic dairy farms in Vermont
increasing from only two in the early 1990s to more than 200 in 2010 (Parsons, 2010).
Higher returns from organic milk sales are probably a significant factor in the high
average profitability of grass-based farms.
A potential for increased profitability may also exist for dairy products
differentiated as “Grass-Fed”. This type of product differentiation has been important for
producers of beef and other meat products, for example through the third party American
Grassfed Association’s “American Grassfed” designation (Steiner & Franzluebbers,
2009). While not yet widespread, a similar potential for added value may eventually
exist for grass-fed dairy products as well.
Milk Production
Whereas grass-based production has demonstrable advantages regarding input
costs, these savings come at the expense of lower milk production per cow. In a
controlled experiment, Kolver and Muller (1998) compared the dry matter intake and
milk production of similar Holsteins fed either high-quality pasture forage or Total Mixed
Rations. They found that the pasture feed provided 19% less dry matter, organic matter,
and net energy for lactation. Milk production per cow was also reduced from an average
of 44.1 kg per day to 29.6 kg per day.
Several other factors should also be considered when considering milk production
on grass-based dairies. For example, sometimes a small amount of concentrate is fed in
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addition to the pasture forage to increase dry matter intake. Supplementing cows on
pasture with a ration of concentrate has been found to increase milk production by about
1 kg milk per kg of concentrate (Bargo et al., 2003). Milk production results are also
complicated by specifics of breeding. For example, Grainger et al. (2009) found that
Holstein cows with a higher proportion of northern hemisphere genes produced more
milk on pasture-based diets than did their counterparts with fewer northern hemisphere
genes.
Overall, while it is clear that in most cases milk production is lower on grassbased systems, the economic data reveal that this reduction is often more than
compensated by the corresponding reduction in input costs, and therefore farm-level
profitability is not generally diminished (see Economic Sustainability section above).
However, the reduction in milk production is important because, as discussed in Section
1.3.6 below, it may serve as a significant perceived barrier among farmers considering
switching to grass-based production.
Resiliency and Risk Management
We have seen that rotational grazing offers lower production costs and capital
investments than confinement-based production. Fewer capital investments mean these
farms may be more adaptable to changes in environment or market forces, and less risky
overall. Cannella (2009) used Monte Carlo simulations to model economic risks
associated with three dairy production systems, finding that, while they have a strong
profitability potential, large confinement operations present more financial uncertainty
than do traditional or rotational grazing farms.
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Profits on large confinement farms are highly susceptible to changes in both input
costs and farm gate milk prices, both of which have proven very volatile in recent years
(Thraen & McNew, 2007; Su & Cook 2015; Su, 2013). Feed grain represents the largest
portion of dairy farm budgets, with confinement farms purchasing the most feed grain per
cow, and grass-based farms purchasing the least (Hanson, 1995). This suggests that
grass-based farms may be more resilient in the face of volatile global grain market
conditions, which show no signs of stabilizing. Similarly, the farm gate price of
conventional milk has been quite volatile since about 1990, and it seems to be getting
more so (Su & Cook, 2015; Su, 2013). Grass-based dairy farmers selling on the organic
market may experience less market fluctuation, leading to steadier profitability and
bolstering economic resiliency. Overall, because they are likely somewhat more shielded
from macroeconomic fluctuations, grass-based dairy farms—particularly those that are
certified organic—will likely exhibit a higher degree of resiliency than large confinement
operations.
Ecological Sustainability
Because they are not perpetually disrupted by agricultural machinery or heavily
sprayed with agrochemicals and fertilizers, grassland forages, or pastures, have a number
of ecological advantages over tilled cropland. Here we will focus on two: (a) the capacity
of grassland forages to maintain high levels of soil organic matter (SOM), thus
sequestering carbon into the soil; and (b) the potential of grassland forages to ease
erosion and nutrient runoff, lessening agricultural non-point source pollution of
waterways.
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Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change
The buildup of atmospheric carbon and other greenhouse gases, leading to global
climate change, is a huge concern for researchers and policymakers alike. To understand
the role of plants and soil in the carbon cycle will require a brief discussion of carbon
dynamics. Photosynthesis converts CO2 and H2O into glucose (C6H12O6), plants’
structural building block, and oxygen. Plants generally grow both above and below the
ground in approximately equal proportions, in the process removing carbon from the
atmosphere. While most of the carbon in the above-ground portion of the plant
eventually oxidizes back into the atmosphere through decomposition, much of the carbon
in the roots and the microorganisms that feed on them becomes sequestered underground.
When soil is tilled, carbon trapped underground is exposed to the air and oxidizes,
returning to the atmosphere. Soil can therefore act as either a carbon source or a carbon
sink, depending on land use. The carbon sequestration rate and carbon-carrying capacity
can be increased by additional soil organic matter, soil biodiversity, and superior soil
structure (Guo and Gifford, 2002).
Various theoretical models have been put forth to explain and predict soil carbon
dynamics, generally positing a number of “pools” of soil carbon, some of which are more
labile (that is, readily oxidized and returned to the atmosphere), whereas some are more
recalcitrant, staying in the ground for years due to chemical or physical properties of the
soil. Whereas disruption of soil aggregates under mechanical tillage, for example,
increases the labile pool of soil carbon, grasslands are particularly adept at increasing the
recalcitrant pools, potentially trapping carbon in the soil for generations (Six et al., 2002).
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Guo and Gifford (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 537 observations from 74
publications addressing land use change in relation to soil carbon stocks. Across studies,
soil carbon decreased by an average of 59% when pasture was converted to cropland.
Conversely, conversion from cropland to pasture increased soil carbon levels by 19%.
Newly-formed perennial pastures have been found to continue to sequester carbon each
year until they reach an equilibrium after 20–40 years, depending on soil type (Hutchison
et al., 2007). Similar findings have been corroborated by other studies. Richard Conant’s
2001 review compiled data from 115 journal articles investigating the impact of land use
on soil carbon, concluding that converting from other land uses to managed grassland
significantly increases both soil carbon content and long-term storage (Conant et al.,
2001).
Bearing in mind that any increase in soil carbon corresponds with an equal
decrease in atmospheric carbon, this body of research suggests that increasing pasture
acreage may significantly mitigate the effect of greenhouse gases on global climate
change. A 2010 study demonstrated a greenhouse gas offset of 10–22% where
conﬁnement dairy systems were converted to pasture-based systems (Rotz et al., 2010).
Overall, the review above clearly demonstrates the advantages of incentivizing grassbased dairy for any policymaker interested in increasing air quality and decreasing
Vermont’s greenhouse gas footprint.
Hydrodynamics and Agricultural Runoff
Compared to cropland soil, pasture soil is more porous and has better structure
because it is not repeatedly compacted by agricultural machinery, and because it is bound
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together by a network of roots. These factors lead to superior water infiltration, meaning
heavy rains are less likely to pool up and run into nearby waterways, carrying away
fertilizers, nutrients, chemicals, and sediment. Soil’s water infiltration rate is also a
major factor in floodwater mitigation.
Gilker (2005) collected groundwater and surface-water samples on mid-Atlantic
rotational grazing dairy farms for a period of three years. No detectable levels of
nitrogen or phosphorus were detected in streams adjacent to pastures, except in one
instance when a farmer had allowed cattle to remain by the stream bank for a long period
of time over the winter. It is often assumed that urine from grazing cattle leaches nitrates
into groundwater, however this conclusion was not borne out in the groundwater
sampling. The study concludes that rotational grazing should be considered an
“environmental Best Management Practice” for dairy farms (Gilker, 2005).
Bishop et al. (2005) used a paired watershed study on a farm located in the
Cannonsville Reservoir watershed in upstate New York to evaluate the effects of
implementation of key BMPs on phosphorus runoff. The BMP treatment specifically
focused on manure management and conversion to rotational grazing. An automated
stream monitoring station recorded water quality for two years pre-treatment, and for four
years after implementation of the BMPs. Following implementation of the BMPs, load
reductions of 43% for dissolved phosphorus and 29% for particulate phosphorus were
recorded.
It has also been found that the use of rotational grazing in particular is preferential
when compared with other forms of grass-based production. In a two-year field trial,
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Schwarte et al. found that rotational grazing of livestock reduced sediment and
phosphorus loading compared with continuous stocking (Schwarte et al., 2011).
Grass-based dairying is not completely without environmental consequence,
however. Research shows that grazing animals should not be given free access to stream
banks, because they will congregate, causing water quality problems (Bilotta et al.,
2007). For this reason, fencing animals off from waterways is critical to achieving the
water quality advantages associated with grass-based agriculture. Additional research
may also be required to determine the differential dynamics of dissolved versus
particulate phosphorus under pasture versus annual crop land use.
There is a large body of scientific research examining the biological mechanisms
underlying the superior hydrological properties of grazed grasslands. Studies in
Serengeti National Park have found that the presence of grazing animals modulates
excess soil phosphorus and accelerates plants’ uptake of nitrogen and phosphorus, both
increasing animal nutrition and limiting phosphorus runoff (Anderson et al., 2007;
Anderson, Ritchie, & McNaughton, 2007). The presence of earthworms has been
suggested to improve soil’s water infiltration by physically aerating and loosening the
soil. Earthworms also allow legumes to fix more nutrients so that plant roots can grow
deeper, facilitating better soil structure and less runoff (Amador & Gorres, 2007).
Pasture soils generally contain three to four times as many earthworms as tilled soils,
measured at 1.2 million/acre for pastures vs. 400,000/acre in tilled soils (Schmidt et al.,
2001). This may be one reason for their superior performance with regard to runoff and
water infiltration.
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Various computer modeling approaches have also shown lower phosphorus
loading and erosion to correlate with the use of grass-based dairying. Rotz et al. (2009)
simulated four management scenarios on a typical 250 acre Pennsylvania dairy
farm. The researchers used an established farm system computer simulation called the
Integrated Farm System Model to generate their predictions. In general, the team found
that converting cropland to perennial grassland significantly reduced phosphorus runoff
and soil erosion. In the rotational grazing scenario in which all cropland was converted
to pasture, erosion was reduced by 87%, sediment-bound P losses reduced by 80%, and
soluble P runoff reduced by 23%. Belflower et al. also used the Integrated Farm System
Model to analyze differentials in runoff and soil loss between two dairy farms in the
southeast USA, one confinement and one pasture-based. A primary finding from that
study was that erosion and phosphorus runoff from the confinement farm were much
greater due to the large area of land tilled to produce annual crops for feed (Belflower et
al., 2012). A 2000 study simulated a representative 200-acre Pennsylvania dairy farm
over a 25 year period and found that use of rotational grazing was predicted to achieve
long-term phosphorus balance (Winsten et al, 2000). Winsten and Stokes used stochastic
dynamic programming to model a hypothetical dairy farm. Financial disincentives for
excess phosphorus accumulation were predicted to cause farmers to switch to rotational
grazing, reducing soil test phosphorus to acceptable levels within 5 years (Winsten and
Stokes, 2004).
Finally, a number of government-sponsored studies confirm that grass-based land
use offers large reductions in soil loss compared with continuous row-cropping. Ontario,
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Canada’s Ministry of Agriculture and Food used the Universal Soil Loss Equation to
generate its agricultural land use recommendations. Their study concluded that land in
permanent pasture offers soil loss reductions of 93% when compared with land in
continuous corn or bean production (Stone, 1996; see Table 1 below).

Table 1: Reduction in Soil Loss Compared to Continuous Corn or Beans (Stone, 1996)
Land Use
Mixed grain or winter wheat
Rotation of 1 yr. corn, 1 yr. grain, 2 yrs. hay pasture or 3 yrs. corn, 3 yrs. hay pasture
Rotation of 2 yrs. corn, 4 yrs. hay pasture
Hay pasture
Permanent pasture

Percent
Reduction
40
60
70
87
93

These findings are roughly echoed in a publication issued by the Vermont
Department of Environmental Conservation, Water Quality Division, which indicates soil
losses from land in active pasture at 2-4 tons per acre per year, and losses from land in
row crops at 8-15 tons per acre per year (Vermont Department of Environmental
Conservation, 2006).
Currently, Vermont is facing a limit on phosphorus loading of waterways to be
imposed by the EPA in the near future. Mitigating runoff of agricultural nutrients is
therefore a major policy goal. Additionally, in the wake of a series of devastating floods,
policymakers are focused on ways to mitigate the risk of large-scale flooding events
(State of Vermont, 2014). This literature review has demonstrated that perennial forages
have superior water infiltration and reduced nutrient runoff compared with tilled land.
Incentivizing the increased use of grass-based dairying in Vermont may represent an
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efficient way to address both of those policy aims while maintaining profitability in the
agricultural sector.
Social Sustainability
In addition to the economic and ecological factors discussed above, grass-based
dairy production has been shown to offer social and health advantages when compared to
other dairy production systems. These benefits fall into three categories: (a) rural
community development; (b) farmer satisfaction; and (c) human health benefits.
Effects on Rural Communities
As we have seen, grass-based farms are able to succeed economically without
significantly scaling up, whereas moving to a large modern confinement model entails
increased scale and farm consolidation. Fewer, larger farms means fewer farm operators,
which can dismantle rural communities. Research has shown that larger numbers of
smaller farms is correlated with a higher quality of life, more equitable economic
distribution, and lower crime rates (Donham et al, 2007; Lyson et al, 2001). Moving
increasingly to grass-based dairy production would therefore likely help to keep
Vermont’s traditional small towns and rural economies vibrant.
Effects on Farmers: Success and Satisfaction
Research shows that grass-based farming may be associated with a higher quality
of life and greater farmer satisfaction than competing dairy production typologies.
Cornell University’s Dairy Farm Business Summary regularly polls northeast dairy
farmers on economic and social issues. In a recent survey, over 80% of respondents
answered the following question positively: “Has the adoption of grazing impacted your
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family’s quality of life?” Reasons given included reduced chore time, healthier cows,
positive comments from neighbors and tourists, and more opportunity to involve their
children (Benson, 2009). A survey issued to dairy farmers in Vermont, Virginia, and
Pennsylvania indicated that farmers using rotational grazing were significantly more
satisfied with their operations than other groups, especially in the areas of feed costs,
machinery repair expenses, levels of anxiety and stress, and financial progress (Winsten,
Parsons, & Hanson, 2000). A 2010 study posed 7-point Likert-scale questions asking
farmers to subjectively rate their feelings of success and satisfaction. Results indicate
that 71.2% of Vermont’s pasture-based farmers feel somewhat to highly successful, and
93.3% are somewhat to extremely satisfied (Colby, 2012).
Effects on Human Health and Nutrition
Nutritionists have shown that milk from cows raised on pasture has tangible
health benefits over milk produced in confinement systems. For example, key vitamins
and antioxidants are less concentrated in milk from grain-fed cows when compared with
milk from grass-fed cows (Jensen et al, 1999). Milk from pastured animals has also been
found to have a healthier ratio of essential fatty acids than that from non-grass-fed
animals (Dhiman et al, 1999). In light of these findings, increasing the availability and
consumption of grass-fed milk and dairy products will likely have positive impacts upon
human health and wellbeing.
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1.3.5. Water-Quality Related Agri-Environmental Policy
Current Policy in Vermont
In order to understand how incentive-based regulation may be used to curtail
environmentally harmful practices in the agricultural sector, it is first necessary to be
familiar with the array of existing and currently proposed policies in this area. The first
phase of the Vermont/Lake Champlain Phosphorus TMDL Implementation Plan has been
submitted to the EPA for approval (State of Vermont, 2014), preceding the phase II
development of watershed-specific policies. The report concludes that agriculture
contributes up to forty percent of the phosphorus load into Lake Champlain (State of
Vermont, 2014). As per the Governor’s summary of the implementation plan provided to
the EPA (Shumlin, 2014), the State will:
1. Increase inspections and compliance efforts for all farms with a focus on small
farms which have been largely unregulated in the past;
2. Implement a requirement that will strengthen livestock exclusion from
perennial waters through regulation and incentives;
3. Update current agricultural regulations to increase management of buffers,
gullies and ditches;
4. Update requirements for and increase investment in nutrient management
planning.
To summarize, the State intends to achieve its phosphorus load reduction goals
primarily through increased inspections, licensing, and more stringent management
standards.
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Vermont’s annual investment in incentive-based nutrient management planning is
significant. Between the beginning of fiscal year 2005 and the end of fiscal year 2013,
the total investment made in agri-environmental projects was $29,026,594 (State of
Vermont, 2014, pp. 21–22). The largest percentage (50.5%) of this total was dedicated to
cost-sharing program incentives for the implementation of Best Management Practices
(BMPs). The Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation (VDEC) Watershed
Management Division (WSMD) Ecosystem Restoration Program (ERP) also managed
numerous outreach and implementation programs that were funded through Clean Water
Act Section 319 grants. Nevertheless, the revised TMDL models developed by the EPA
indicate that Vermont still needs to reduce its phosphorus load to Lake Champlain by
39%, with a 5% margin of safety (State of Vermont, 2014, p. 29). For the agricultural
sector, the overwhelming majority of phosphorus reduction is proposed to take place
through the regulation of nonpoint source pollution, such as through the Best
Management Practices Program (State of Vermont, 2014, p. 45). While grass-based
dairying is not currently listed as a Best Management Practice under this program, it does
have similar potential to mitigate agricultural runoff, and has been considered a BMP by
various scholars (see e.g. Gilker, 2005).
Factors Affecting BMP Adoption Rates
In order to analyze the efficacy of potential new policies, it is necessary to review
the research concerning factors which influence farmers’ adoption rates of BMPs. In
their quantitative meta-analysis of the BMP adoption literature, Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy,
and Floress (2012) isolate the handful of variables that have the largest impact on
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farmers’ decisions to adopt BMPs. These were found to be, “access to and quality of
information, financial capacity, and being connected to agency or local networks of
farmers or watershed groups” (Floress, 2012, p. 17).
These variables are presaged in Baerenklau’s (2005) analysis of 34 pasture-based
dairy farmers in Wisconsin. His study identified risk preferences, uncertainty regarding
profitability, and observation of peers’ decisions to adopt as factors influencing adoption.
Additionally, McCann et al. (2014) conducted a mail survey of over 3,000 livestock
producers in Missouri and Iowa. Their analysis of the 1,000+ responses found that the
relative level of observability and the complexity of the technique are further indicators
that predict adoption.
Finally, Zia (2014) surveyed 80 farmers in Vermont, using the Theory of Planned
Behavior framework (Ajzen, 1985) to assess linkages between farmer motivations and
their propensity to adopt BMPs. The study found that perceived behavioral control had
the largest effect on BMP adoption rates. This finding suggests that policies which aim
to increase farmers’ agency and their sense of control, such as technical assistance
concerning BMP implementation, may be a valuable driver of positive behavior change
in the form of increased BMP adoption.
Assessing the Effectiveness of Agri-Environmental Policy
Environmental and agricultural policymakers continue to seek ways to mitigate
the negative environmental externalities of agricultural production, such as water quality
issues caused by phosphorus runoff. This section of the literature review summarizes
several articles that are aimed at this problem, focusing on research that privileges
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increased citizen (i.e., farmer) participation and agency. This focus is aimed at
discovering policy tools that are guided by the empirical research regarding farmer
adoption of BMPs.
Premised upon the argument that cost-sharing and similar policies do not
encourage farmers to be either cost-effective or innovative with respect to farming
operations, Winsten et al. (2011a) focused on performance-based incentives, specifically
those where farmers are rewarded for achieving pollution-reduction goals. Common
performance-based incentives include direct payments, tax credits, liability protection
(i.e., safe harbor), public recognition, or penalties. Performance-based incentives are
focused on outcomes rather than any specific BMP or combination of BMPs. As a result,
farmers are encouraged to learn, innovate, and determine the best set of practices to adopt
in order to achieve the desired environmental outcome.
Along similar lines, Bosch, Pease, Wieland, and Parker (2013) developed
economic and empirical models to test the relative benefit of performance versus practice
incentives in nitrogen abatement agri-environmental policy. While both performance and
practice incentives were associated with specific costs and challenges such as intensive
compliance monitoring and direct financial incentive payments, the authors found that
performance incentives hold the potential for cost minimization where nitrogen
abatement is a policy goal. However, performance incentive policies are also prone to
policy-specific moral hazards and target-related inefficiencies. For example, policies that
provide incentives for decreased levels of nitrogen are susceptible to “baseline shifting,”
a practice wherein farmers temporarily increase pollution-causing practices during
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baseline periods in order to increase incentive payments during the incentive period.
Baseline shifting is both a moral hazard as well as counterproductive with respect to
goals for nitrogen abatement. The authors suggest that performance incentive policies
could be structured based upon attainment of specified levels of nitrogen loss per acre,
for example, rather than through measurement of reduction (i.e., change of nitrogen loss
over time). While the level-attainment incentive structure would be less cost-effective
than the reduction incentive—because of the inability to provide different levels of
incentive for higher and lower levels of reduction relative to baselines—it would avoid
the moral hazard and inefficiencies posed by the problem of baseline shifting.
Finally, Reimer (2014) states that “top-down approaches, particularly ones that
focus only on the tools of conservation (e.g., BMPs) rather than real environmental
outcomes, have been largely unsuccessful at solving our most pressing environmental
problems” (p. 60a). Rather than, for example, mandating the use of specific BMPs across
all farms, Reimer points to bottom-up solutions which rely on the localized knowledge of
farmers and experts within a certain geographical region or who use similar management
methods. For the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs, this study focuses
primarily on policies that strengthen individual farmer agency rather than command and
control regulation.
1.3.6. Barriers to the Adoption of Grass-Based Production
Despite the profitability and sustainability advantages associated with rotational
grazing, as of 2006, only 13% of dairy producers in the northeast region were using the
technique (Winsten et al, 2011). In order to incentivize its increased use, researchers
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must identify the barriers preventing farmers from adopting this useful technology.
Winsten et al. (2011b) analyzed almost 1000 northeast large confinement, traditional, and
rotational grazing farmers’ perceptions of 11 barriers to switching to rotational grazing.
The top barriers perceived by farmers were related to income, land, and work,
specifically “decrease in milk production”, “decrease in farm profits”, “decrease in cash
flow”, “difficulty producing enough feed for winter”, “lack of land for grazing”, “amount
of work to start rotational grazing”, and “amount of work to manage rotational grazing.”
It is commonly assumed that farmers perceive high barriers concerning lack of technical
assistance and information, but Winsten’s research suggests that these are not major
factors, indicating that perhaps incentive programs should focus elsewhere.
A Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test of farmers’ perceptions both before and after
switching to rotational grazing revealed that most of the barriers they perceived to be
significant before switching ended up being much less significant after they had made the
transition. Whereas before switching farmers were concerned about decrease in milk
production, decrease in cash ﬂow, decrease in farm proﬁts, and skepticism from family
members, after establishing rotational grazing systems these factors did not represent
significant concerns (Winsten et al., 2011b). This suggests that, despite the finding that
technical information about rotational grazing is not a key perceived barrier, contact with
experienced farmers who are successfully employing rotational grazing may allay
concerns and act as an incentive to increase adoption. If this analysis holds, it would
suggest that the biggest barrier to the adoption of grass-based methods is simply the
uncertainty associated with adopting an unfamiliar practice. This corroborates Zia’s
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(2014) analysis, which points to perceived behavioral control—or familiarity with the
technical specifics and likely outcomes of a novel agricultural practice—as strongly
correlated with the adoption of other novel BMPs.
1.3.7. Proposed Public Policy Interventions to Incentivize Grass-Based Dairying
Agricultural public policy incentives can be broadly categorized into positive
incentives, which provide money, goods, or services to farmers in exchange for actions
which work toward policy goals; and disincentives, which impose a cost if farmers use
practices which contradict policy goals. Both types of incentive are briefly discussed
below. Another category of incentives are targeted incentives, which analyze which
farmers should be targeted by incentive programs to optimize the use of resources and
effect the greatest change. Finally, a category of public policy programs which aim at
increasing farmer connectivity in an attempt to foster behavior change through peer-topeer learning is discussed.
Positive Incentives
Subsidies for rotational grazing adoption could come in the form of cash
payments, free or low cost insurance programs, grants, tax credits, or other mechanisms.
Based on their analysis of barriers to rotational grazing adoption, Winsten et al. (2011a)
suggest three possible policy interventions with relevance for Vermont. One is a “green
payment” approach which links carbon sequestration and water quality improvements
from conversion to perennial forage with debt relief assistance. The next is a debt
restructuring program which targets highly-leveraged farms. The third is a revenue
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assistance program which assures minimum profitability during the transition to
rotational grazing.
Disincentives
A stochastic dynamic programming model for a hypothetical dairy farm showed
that financial disincentives for phosphorus accumulation led farmers to reduce herd sizes
and switch to seasonal rotational grazing, but it also cost farmers an average of $524 per
hectare per year (Winsten and Stokes, 2004). Direct financial disincentives like this may
effect change, but they may also work against other policy goals, since they would
financially burden already-struggling small farmers and likely lead to attrition. This topic
needs further study.
A possible non-financial disincentive relates to the pending GMO labeling
legislation in Vermont. The current legislation exempts conventional dairy producers
who use GMO feed from labeling requirements. However, if this loophole were
removed, market forces may incentivize farmers to look for ways to feed their cows that
do not rely on GMO corn, prompting increased interest in rotational grazing.
Targeted Incentives
Farmers currently using large confinement systems perceive far higher barriers to
the adoption of rotational grazing, especially when it comes to “decrease in farm profits”
and “not enough land for grazing” (Winsten et al., 2011b). This is likely due to the heavy
investment and asset fixity associated with their large herds and specialized equipment;
and the correspondingly-high levels of debt which large confinement operators often
carry (Cannella, 2011). Because large confinement farmers are both less able and less
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likely to switch to rotational grazing, and also because they may already be running
profitable operations, it probably does not make sense to focus incentive programs on
these farmers. A primary aim of this project is to conduct further research into targeted
policy incentive optimization, including determining which types of farmers would
benefit most from transitioning to rotational grazing.
Peer-Based Policies
A number of peer-learning based approaches have historically been implemented
in an attempt to increase the use of Best Management Practices in agriculture. Model
farms were commonly established in the 19th century as centers of both agricultural
research and education. Their methods were designed to be replicable or emulable, and
they served as learning hubs for the community, in order to enhance overall agricultural
efficiency and productivity (Wade, 2002). Farmer Field Schools (FFS) are a group-based
approach which have successfully been used to teach best management and other
beneficial practices to farmers around the world. They rely on bottom-up, largely peerderived knowledge rather than centrally-designed, “one size fits all” messaging, and are
often held at participants’ own farms. In this way, information may be shared between
farmers concerning techniques that work for specific farm typologies, but may be glossed
over by hegemonic recommendations (Sustainable Agriculture Information Initiative,
2010). Farmer Field Schools have proven effective in promoting the adoption of BMPs,
most notably the technique of Integrated Pest Management (Feder, Murgai, & Quizon,
2004; Rebaudo & Dangles, 2013). The observation that many rotational grazing farmers
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are already encouraged to adopt the technique through existing peer networks suggests
that peer-based approaches may be effective in this context.
1.3.8. Conclusions from Literature Review
As traditional small-scale dairy farms are increasingly pressured by the cost-price
squeeze of fluctuating milk prices coupled with higher feed production and purchase
prices, they must increase the efficiency of their production systems to maintain
profitability. The above literature review has demonstrated that increased use of
intensively-managed grass-based dairy production offers the opportunity to enhance
indicators of ecological and social sustainability while maintaining or augmenting
profitability in Vermont’s dairy sector. While large confinement farms can certainly be
profitable as well, all else being equal this type of management may have negative effects
on important policy goals such as phosphorus runoff and rural community development.
This study contends that it would therefore be in policymakers’ best interest to
incentivize the increased use of grass-based dairy production, and to consider rotational
grazing a Best Management Practice, especially for smaller-scale dairy operations.
Recognizing that peer learning may play a pivotal role in farmers’ decisions to
adopt new innovations, a series of methods which aim to discover the mechanisms behind
these adoption dynamics, along with the theoretical justification for their use in this
project, are discussed in the following section.
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1.4. Review of Methodology
1.4.1. Expert Input
To determine key farm and farmer attributes and policy incentive options, a series
of expert interviews were initially conducted with agricultural economists and dairy
experts. Expert interviews have been shown to be an excellent way to gather structuring
information before delving into more comprehensive methods. Keeney et al. (1990)
describe a method called the “Public Value Forum”—variously also called a “Delphi
Group”—which has been successfully used to elicit public input when faced with
complex policy decisions. The first step in this process is to carry out “structuring
activities” which narrow a complex problem down to a defined set of attributes by
consulting with experts and representatives of stakeholder groups. There is no doubt that
a paradigm change such as shifting dairy production models is a complex problem,
spanning across academic disciplines, and imbued with diverse preexisting beliefs and
perceptions amongst the target population of Vermont dairy farmers. This project used
expert stakeholder input to inform a range of attributes of the decision problem at hand,
such as identifying barriers and suggesting policy interventions. This structuring
information informed the creation of the interview schedule used to assess Vermont dairy
farmers’ motivational attitudes and decision-making patterns, the experimental design of
the behavioral economics game, and finally the calibration of the agent-based model.
1.4.2. Structured Farmer Interviews
Davis and Wagner (2004) posit that local knowledge is an important and often
overlooked element of resource management decisions, which are often informed from a
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top-down perspective by institutional insiders. They suggest identifying “alternative”
experts who have a more embedded type of expertise which better reflects “on the
ground” realities. The authors advocate corroborating information across at least three
local knowledge experts to assure that their expertise reflects systemic realities. As part
of a Knowledge Management approach, this study endeavored to seek out local
knowledge experts, specifically farmers with on-the-ground experience interacting with
state policy concerning agriculture and the environment.
Original in-depth interview research was stratified across three key dairy farmer
stakeholder groups: confinement farmers, grass-based farmers, and farmers who had
transitioned between the two. A total of 8 structured interview sessions were conducted
with 10 Vermont dairy managers, stratified across these typologies to as great a degree as
was feasible considering the relatively low number of interviews. Stratified sampling in
interview-based research has been shown to be an effective way to capture multiple
viewpoints when there is clear theoretical rationale for assuming that the groups will
differ in meaningful ways (Robinson, 2014). Interview schedules were crafted specific to
each stakeholder group which addressed barriers and incentives identified through the
expert input phase. Interviews were transcribed and analyzed thematically, with
particular attention to perceived barriers, characteristics of innovation diffusion, and
potential incentive efficacy. The differential motivational attitudes of farmers were
compared across the stratified typologies. This qualitative analysis was used to inform
both the behavioral economics experiment and the decision rules of agents in the ABM.
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1.4.3. Behavioral Economics Experimentation: Assessing the Role of Information
Uncertainty in Economic Decision-Making
Farmers considering implementing a new practice or switching from one
production paradigm to another operate under conditions of information uncertainty. In
fact, farmers always operate under uncertainty due to incomplete information concerning
costs of inputs and farm-gate prices of agricultural goods, weather, market trends, and
other factors. Decision making under such conditions has been referred to as “bounded
rationality” (Simon, 1982), and may take on features not observed in economic
environments in which optimization is an available strategy. A behavioral economics
experiment was designed to analyze the extent to which lack of complete information
and/or uncertainty about outcomes following the implementation of a new practice or
method may affect farmer decision making surrounding BMP implementation. This
experiment assessed whether decreasing information uncertainty, for example by
facilitating access to the economic choices and outcomes of other actors in the
marketplace, may increase perceptions of personal agency and lead to increased BMP
adoption behavior.
Based on observations of economic actions which are generally regarded as
aberrations from standard economic behavior, Alchian (1950) proposed an analytical
model within which uncertainty of foresight and incomplete information render
meaningless the concept of profit maximization, instead giving rise to adaptive, imitative,
and trial-and-error behaviors. Alchian hypothesized that under these conditions,
successful actions are selected not through a calculable optimum, but by the various
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actions actually tried by the economic actor and/or other visible actors making similar
decisions in the marketplace. Despite the actors themselves being oblivious to the
optimal course of action—thereby making a true Nash equilibrium impossible—this
theory explains why economic behaviors are still often observed to converge upon a
predictable optimum course which appears to approximate the Nash equilibrium.
Building upon the work of Alchian (1950), Rhode and Stegeman (2001) aimed to
discover whether and when imitation is a rational decision and what effects imitation has
on equilibrium in a relatively more realistic and dynamic Darwinian model of economic
competition. In realistic settings, profit maximization is meaningless and payoff is
uncertain. Under these conditions, imitation may be considered a rational choice. “If
computation is costly, then imitators can prosper among a population of optimizers”
(Conlisk, 1980 as cited in Rhode & Stegeman, 2001, p. 418). In information-uncertain
environments, backwards-looking imitation may be more fruitful than forwards-looking
optimization, while offering more certainty than a random trial-and-error decision. This
is especially true in highly complex and dynamic situations. As imitators adopt the
relatively more successful strategies of their rivals, decisions converge upon a non-Nash
equilibrium, namely, relative payoff maximization. In instances in which other actors’
behaviors are observable, the authors determined that the Darwinian price is lower than
Bertrand-Nash and Cournot-Nash prices, because the spiteful behavior of imitators
affects the ability of rational agents to maximize profit effectively. This paper is wellsuited to this project because the authors assume that the Darwinian dynamics present in
this kind of behavior—relative payoff maximization—is most likely to be present in
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small groups of strategically-related agents. Nevertheless, this model of competition may
not be ideally suited to the population of small dairy farmers, who collectively comprise a
rival producer of dairy products. It may be the case that we would need to consider the
case of the small dairy farmer in aggregate versus other dairy producers, but then the
applicability to the case of BMP adoption is unclear.
Contra Friedman’s (1953) claim that profit maximization is a rational survival
strategy in a Darwinian economic model, Schaffer (1989) applies Hamilton’s (1970)
“spite” evolutionary biological theory to this model and finds that profit maximizers are
only “fittest” under conditions of perfect competition. However, under conditions of
market power, the fittest firms would be those who exercise spite, that is, those that
choose to hurt themselves so as to hurt their rivals more. By lowering prices and not
maximizing profits, firms with less market power demonstrate greater fitness by
decreasing rival and more powerful firms’ profit by a greater amount than their own.
Spiteful, non-maximizing firms are thereby more likely to survive, that is, they
demonstrate superior fitness. It is unclear how this model will apply to the situation that
we will be attempting to test, namely, the market for small dairy farms. In this situation,
small dairy farmers are not attempting maximum growth. Rather, they are attempting to
minimize costs and maximize profit while the size of their business remains relatively
stable. This article is possibly applicable in an aggregate analysis of small dairy farms
versus other forms of dairy farming.
Cabrales et al. (2007) ran a coordination game (game with multiple equilibria)
under which participants operated with various degrees of uncertainty about true payoff
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potentials. The researchers observed that behavior generally converges upon the
theoretical prediction after sufficient experience has been gained. In a baseline treatment
of incomplete information, it took roughly 50 rounds before behavior converged. The
authors suggest that subjects arrived at this equilibrium not by careful introspection, but
by observation of the behavior of other players. Suri and Watts (2011) ran a public goods
game in which treatments were varied based on network typology, finding that network
typology did not significantly correlate with differences between subject contributions in
that experimental context.
Our experiment follows up on the studies presented above, empirically testing
whether imitative behaviors are an important facilitator of the adoption of novel practices
in the context of an agricultural commodity market, like that for milk, when firms operate
under information uncertainty. This experiment measures the rate of adoption among
socially networked “farmers” under varying levels of information uncertainty based on
proximity and access to information about other players’ successful behavior. In a series
of computer-based experiments, 12 participants per session played a “social learning”
game within peer network topologies of varying degree, and with the presence or absence
of a perfectly-performing automated model peer. We hypothesize that rotational grazing
is adopted more quickly in more highly informed and/or larger networks.
1.4.4. Knowledge Management
The selection of raw information used to calibrate a computer model is crucial to
the accuracy and relevance of the knowledge that emerges when the model is run; thus
the adage, “garbage in, garbage out.” A structured knowledge management and in-depth
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interview process will ensure that the information upon which the Dairy Farm Transitions
Agent Based Model rests captures on-the-ground realities for Vermont farmers and
policymakers. The first step in this process is to identify the set of inputs required for the
model (North & Macal, 2007). These input requirements, based on which factors will be
endogenous to the model, determine the set of data necessary for model calibration.
Knowledge Management (KM) takes a multi-disciplined approach to effectively
capture, code, store, and use available knowledge. The approach focuses on merging
existing datasets with human input, evaluating both tacit and explicit knowledge about a
subject (Alavi & Leidner, 2001). Data used to assign decision rules to agents in an ABM
are often drawn from a variety of existing sources (North & Macal, 2007). In this case,
such sources include the USDA Census of Agriculture, Vermont Center for Geographic
Information, survey data from previous academic studies on Vermont dairy farmers (e.g.
Colby, 2012; Cannella, 2009), and original qualitative and quantitative research
conducted as part of this project.
1.4.5. Agent-Based Modeling of Coupled Human and Natural Systems
Agent-based simulations have been widely used to model complex systems in
which humans interact with the natural environment, each influencing the state of the
other. Agent-based modeling can incorporate the influence of human decision-making on
land use in a mechanistic, formal, and spatially explicit way, taking into account social
interaction, adaptation, and decision-making at different levels. Agent-based models are
especially adept at incorporating non-monetary influences on decision making and
linking social and environmental processes (Matthews et al., 2007). A 2012 review of
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coupled human and natural systems (CHANS) agent-based models showed the efficacy
of the methodology, concluding that calibration of human decision-making patterns
should be a primary consideration for future research (An, 2012). Filatova et al. (2013)
identify four challenges to agent-based CHANS modeling: (1) design and parameterizing
of agent decision models, (2) verification, validation and sensitivity analysis, (3)
integration of socio-demographic, ecological, and biophysical models, and (4) spatial
representation. These challenges must be considered and addressed as a model is
developed.
Multi-agent system models of land-use/cover change (MAS/LUCC models) are a
subset of agent-based models which combine a geographically-situated landscape model
with agent-based representations of decision making. In this way, the interaction
between agents and their environment can be represented. MAS/LUCC models have
proven particularly effective at modeling complex spatial interactions under
heterogeneous conditions, and for modeling decentralized, autonomous decision making
(Parker et al., 2003). For example, a number of MAS/LUCC ABMs have been developed
to model the landscape-level impacts associated with human settlement patterns (Kohler
et al., 2000; Sanders et el., 1997). MAS/LUCC models have also been developed with a
specific focus on the impacts of agriculture upon the natural and built environment. Such
approaches have addressed issues such as the diffusion of novel agricultural practices
which impinge upon agricultural investment, production, and land renting (Balmann
1997; Balmann et al., 2002; Berger 2001); and cropping decisions with environmental
sustainability impacts such as tropical deforestation (Lim et al., 2002; Lynam, 2002).
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The ABM project undertaken here, which is titled the Dairy Farm Transitions
Agent Based Model (DFTABM), incorporates elements of previous MAS/LUCC ABM
research, and applies them toward the specific policy problem outlined in the literature
review above, namely the diffusion of grass-based production in the Vermont dairy
industry. The DFTABM incorporates a farmer network model, which facilitates the
spread of novel technologies according the patterns observed in the qualitative phase of
this research, as well as those derived from the results of the experimental economics
game outlined above. The DFTABM model is calibrated to reflect present on-the-ground
realities in Vermont such that experiments with relevance for Vermont policymakers may
be carried out. The model also serves as a scalable backbone which can be re-calibrated
to address the diffusion of other agricultural practices, providing a basis for future
research in this area.
1.4.6. Conclusions from Methodology Review
The above review of methodology was meant to provide a theoretical basis upon
which this project may be carried out. It has outlined three primary research methods: (a)
qualitative interview research, (b) behavioral economics experimentation, and (c) the
development of an agent-based computer model. Results from these research endeavors
will be discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 to follow. These chapters take the form of
academic journal articles intended for publication in early 2016. Chapter 2 will present
the behavioral economics experiment, while Chapter 3 addresses the development of the
DFTABM.
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CHAPTER 2: SIZE MATTERS: INNOVATION DIFFUSION IN AN OFFLINE
CLUSTERED SOCIAL NETWORK EXPERIMENT

Experiment undertaken in collaboration with:
Katherine Logan (co-Principle Investigator), Scott Merrill, and Jacob Fooks

Article written for submission to:
The Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics

This research has been funded by the Northeast Water Resources Network, through
National Science Foundation grant IIA #1330446.

2.1. Abstract
A behavioral economics game was developed in order to test the way participation in
peer networks of varying degrees and configurations facilitates or hinders decisionmaking under conditions of information uncertainty. The specific decision modeled was a
farmer deciding whether to implement a new, environmentally-beneficial management
practice. A web-based computer platform was developed using the Python language,
which simulated networks of small dairy farm enterprises. Participants operated as farm
managers, playing a series of three ten-round computerized games in groups of 10-11
players. Players were networked in either pairs, trios, groups of six, or groups of twelve.
All but one treatment also included an automated “seed player” who made optimal
decisions in every round, such that in all “seeded” treatments, participants theoretically
had access to the same information quality. After each round, information about the farm
management decisions and financial outcomes of all other players in a given network,
including the automated “seed,” was made available to the other participants in the
network. Participants were paid based on their farm’s financial performance over the
three games. Results indicate that players in networks with higher numbers of peers made
better economic decisions on average. The inclusion of an automated “seed player”
within a given network configuration also facilitated better decision-making. Both of
these correlations are statistically significant. Furthermore, the shape of the “diffusion
curve” of new adoptees confirms other literature on innovation diffusion dynamics.
Public policy implications from this work include an increased focus on facilitating peerto-peer learning among farmers where Best Management Practice adoption is a policy
goal.

52

2.2. Introduction
Given the pressing need to reduce or eliminate the environmental externalities
that arise from certain agricultural practices, there has been increasing interest among
policymakers and network theorists to understand the processes by which farmers decide
to adopt environmentally sustainable Best Management Practices (BMPs). Social
learning has proven to be an effective model for understanding the ways in which the
adoption of new agricultural management techniques diffuse through natural social
networks (Ryan & Gross, 1943; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley & Udry, 2001;
Munshi, 2004; Young, 2009; Rebaudo & Dangles, 2013). Other studies affirm the
centrality of social learning for farmers’ adoption of BMPs (Baerenklau, 2005;
Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, & Floress, 2012; McCann et al., 2014; Zia, 2014). While it has
been found that observing the successes one’s peers aids in overcoming barriers to
adoption that arise from uncertainty about new agricultural technologies, what is not
known is what impact the size of a farmer’s social network may have upon the diffusion
dynamics which lead to increased BMP adoption.
This study aims to address this question by empirically testing the diffusion of
agricultural BMP adoption in a controlled laboratory environment using a custom
behavioral economics game. Our goal is to verify theorized dynamics associated with the
adoption of novel behaviors, and specifically to identify the social network size that
provides the most effective level of positive information externalities under conditions of
information uncertainty (Shampine, 1998; Eksin et al., 2013). A real-life application of a
game such as ours might include the development of peer learning networks by
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agricultural extension offices for the purpose of disseminating target BMPs. In such a
case, understanding optimal network size and diffusion dynamics would increase the
efficiency and effectiveness of agri-environmental policy implementation (Beaman et al.,
2014).
We designed a three-round, offline network game in which participants were
randomly assigned to clustered social networks of varying sizes, or total degrees (Walker
& Muchnik, 2014). Participants made decisions about whether to adopt a new or
maintain a current agricultural management practice over the course of ten “years,” and
were allowed perfect ex-post monitoring of their own and the decisions of peers within
their networks after each year of play. Additionally, four out of five network typologies
tested in our experiment, unbeknownst to the other network members, included an
automated “seed” player who made individually optimal decisions for each round of play.
Because payouts for the decision to adopt a new or maintain a current
management practice varied in each game, and participants were only given information
regarding the continued profit they would receive from maintaining their current
management practice, participants were forced to rely upon the information that they
received from monitoring the results of their own and their peers’ management decisions.
Monitoring has been shown to improve overall performance in economics experiments
(Deck & Nikifourakis, 2012). In this experimental context, careful monitoring of peers’
decisions and outcomes provided the ability for a player to make management decisions
that resulted in high profitability for her own farm enterprise.
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In the literature on network modeling, the relative complexity and risk related to
the decision to adopt a new technology influences the effectiveness of social networks of
varying degrees and length of network ties (Centola & Macy, 2007; Centola, 2010). For
riskier and more complex behavioral adoption, social learning in clustered networks
proves to be the most successful means of diffusion. Additionally, it has been theorized
that in the context of information uncertainty, optimization ceases to be a viable strategy
for profit maximization, and instead bounded rationality in the form adaptive behaviors
informed through trial-and-error and imitation step in to guide decision-making (see, e.g.,
Alchian, 1950; Rhode & Stegeman, 2001).
Previous experimental economics research into information uncertainty suggests
that, in the context of a coordination game, decision-making eventually converges upon a
theoretical equilibrium as players observe the behavior of their peers (Cabrales et al.,
2007). The question is then whether or not socially derived information improves results
in the context of a price-taking commodity market. It seems that this has been
demonstrated empirically in the dissemination of complex agricultural techniques. For
example, Farmer Field Schools (FFS) have proven effective in encouraging the adoption
of BMPs, though the complexity of the BMPs sometimes provided a barrier to the spread
of the new behavior beyond the FFS networks (Feder, Murgai, & Quizon, 2004; Rebaudo
& Dangles, 2013). The need to understand the optimal size for network development is,
once again, especially crucial to the successful implementation of agricultural policy
where contagion and the observability of neighbors’ behaviors are limited by the
technical complexity of target BMPs.
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For the purposes of studying the dissemination of behavior like environmentallysustainable BMPs, it is necessary to design games that do not include mechanisms such
as equilibria under cooperation, or even public goods scenarios. This is because, in an
agricultural commodity market, the implementation of target BMPs may bolster
profitability on individual farms without significantly affecting these farms’
competitiveness with respect to their neighbors’ conventional output. The target BMP
assessed by this experiment is known as grass-based dairy farming. On smaller farms in
particular, grass-based production has been found to generally improve the profitability
of the farms on which it is implemented, while also achieving environmental goals
(Bishop et al., 2005; Foltz & Lang, 2005; Gillespie et al., 2009; Hanson et al., 2009; Rotz
et al., 2009). To assess the dynamics associated with such a scenario, we would benefit
from the development of games that test decision making in networks where the goal is
one’s own individual optimum, and where providing information to peers and stimulating
social learning are externalities of the decision making process; a case in which the
“rising tide lifts all boats.” Such an experiment would be valuable in illuminating the
relationship between network structures and information diffusion characteristics, in
particular the network size best suited to individual success and optimal information
externalization.
Research has shown that social learning through adult peer interaction can be an
effective driver of behavior change (e.g. Milbrath, 1989; Keen et al., 2005; McKenzieMohr, 2011). It has been suggested that under conditions of information uncertainty, as
modeled in this experiment, economic actors assume a constrained model of self-interest
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based on bounded rationality, relying on strategies other than optimization—namely
adaptation via trial-and-error and imitation—to achieve favorable economic outcomes
(Alchian, 1950; Selten, 1990; Simon, 1957, 1982). Further, under conditions of bounded
rationality, backwards-looking imitation is a computationally-inexpensive method of
decision-making which is often superior to simply guessing (Conlisk, 1980 as cited in
Rhode & Stegeman, 2001). These are the assumed characteristics of the participants in
our game, whom we then placed into social networks in order to observe the ways in
which good information diffused amongst and influenced the members of these networks.
Finally, Rogers (2010) provides a mechanism, called “Social Diffusion of
Innovation,” which helps to explain the dynamics at play here, postulating a sigmoid
diffusion curve that encompasses early, middle, and late adopters. Rogers suggests that,
to facilitate optimal diffusion of innovation, networks should have both a level of
homophily and of heterophily. This effect has also been described in the network theory
literature, which contends that the stabilization of linkages over time leads to homophily
(Burt, 1992), whereas heterophily results when a central actor forms a bridge between
two dissimilar actors (Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Burt, 1992). The level of homophily and
heterophily within a networked system has also been found to correlate with network
outcomes (Burt, 2000). In this experimental context, we assume that, given a random set
of participants, a larger sample will tend to encompass a larger degree of heterogeneity
among participants. Accepting this assumption, it follows that when participants are
assigned into network groupings at random, a network of higher total degree will tend to
result in a greater level of network heterophily. In other words, under conditions of
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random assignment, in larger networks it is more likely that players will be in contact
with peers who have made decisions that are both similar to and different from their own.
Following work by Suri and Watts (2011), who did not find significant
differences between subject contributions in a public goods game based on network
typology, we aimed to explore whether network connectivity influences the decisionmaking quality of participants operating under information uncertainty in a simulated
commodity (price taking) market. Our study contributes to the literature by analyzing the
innovation diffusion effects associated with (1) the presence or absence of perfect
information within a network, and (2) the size, or total degree, of a network. We
hypothesize that the inclusion of a single automated player providing a model of perfect
play should promote better decision-making among the other actors in a given network
by increasing the quality of information available within that network. We also
hypothesize that, in an information uncertain marketplace, the ability to monitor the
performance of higher numbers of networked peers should lead to better average decision
making within a given network, although there may be a size limit beyond which higher
numbers of peers ceases to facilitate more efficient diffusion. Network performance in
this experiment can be assessed by examining the innovation diffusion dynamics within a
given network throughout the ten-round experiment, as well as the average level of
profitability achieved by players in each network.
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Our research questions are thus as follows:
RQ1: Under conditions of information uncertainty, to what extent does the
inclusion of a single well-informed peer impact the decision-making
quality of the other individuals located within a network?
RQ2: Under conditions of information uncertainty, is there a relationship
between average decision making quality and network total degree?

2.3. Methods
We developed a multi-round, offline game designed to ascertain the extent to
which the size of peer networks and/or the inclusion of a perfectly-performing peer
within a network affects the quality of decision making for actors in a marketplace in
which information uncertainty is a constraint. The game was developed using the Python
programming language, and was based on the Willow experimental economics platform
(Weel & McCabe, n.d.). Participants were randomly selected from a cohort of University
of Vermont (UVM) student volunteers. Recruitment of participants was accomplished
through direct outreach to undergraduate students in two UVM courses, postings on the
UVM graduate student email list, and advertisements at the UVM student union.
Recruits scheduled their sessions via confidential web-based Doodle polls. Sessions were
held under the auspices of the Social Ecological Gaming and Simulation (SEGS) lab at
the University of Vermont during late 2014 and early 2015. A total of 85 participants
completed the game in a series of 8 experimental sessions. In each session, between 10
and 12 participants at a time were provided with desktop computers loaded with our
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network-based software. Each experimental session was comprised of three separate
games, and lasted roughly 45 minutes. In order to provide a payoff dominant incentive,
the sessions were designed such that players could earn between $13.50 and $28.50,
depending on their performance.
In each of three games, participants began with zero dollars and were asked to
make a series of ten management choices, one per round (called “years” in the game),
that could influence the profitability of their simulated farm enterprises. At the outset of
each round, participants made a simple decision: they chose either to (a) continue their
current management method and earn a known profit, or (b) adopt a new management
method with unknown financial consequences. If a participant chose to adopt the new
management method in any given round, he or she was committed to that choice for the
remainder of the ten-round game.
On the main interface screen of the game (see Appendix 1 for a screenshot),
participants were provided with a self-updating table that allowed for perfect ex-post
monitoring of the management decisions and resultant financial outcomes of each of the
other players within their peer networks. Participants were given scratch paper and a pen
to do their own arithmetical calculations, if desired. At the end of each session,
participants were issued U.S. dollars equivalent to the sum of the cumulative profits over
all three games of their own farm enterprises. Participants were only allowed to
participate for a single session, and were instructed to keep any information they learned
about the experimental design confidential. All information in this paragraph (but no
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additional information) was given to participants via an instruction sheet and verbal
directions at the beginning of each session.

Figure 1: Schematic Representations of Peer Network Configurations. Arrows Indicate
the Direction of Information Flow. Figures were Generated Using ORA Network
Analysis Software.

Five treatments, varying by peer network typology, were tested in this study
(Figure 1). In seeded treatments, players were not aware that the seed was an automated
player, so that they would not treat the information gleaned from this source
preferentially over human peers. The purpose of the seed was to control for information
quality within each network. The inclusion of a seed ensured that participants in all
seeded treatments had access to the same ideal information, allowing us to assess the
diffusion dynamics arising from differential peer network total degrees. Network
treatments ranged in size from one to eleven human players. For example, in the Seeded
Pairs treatment, our smallest network, each player was connected only to the seed,
61

whereas in the Seeded Twelves treatment, our largest network, each player was
connected to ten human players in addition to the automated seed. Eleven Seeded Pairs
networks were tested, totaling eleven players. Seven Seeded Trios networks were tested,
totaling 14 players. Four Seeded Sixes networks were tested, totaling 20 players. Two
Seeded Twelves networks were tested, totaling 22 players.
The Unseeded Trios treatment differed from the others in that it did not include an
automated seed player. Comparing the performance of the Seeded Trios network to the
Unseeded Trios—a network with an equivalent degree, but lacking the perfect-quality
information provided by the seed—allowed us to analyze the diffusion dynamics
associated with the presence or absence of a single agent operating ideally. Six Unseeded
Trios networks were tested, for a total of 18 players.
Each participant completed three subtreatments, or versions of the game, which
varied based upon the financial consequences of adoption of the new management
method versus maintenance of the current management method. In two subtreatments, it
was individually optimal to adopt the new management method immediately, whereas in
the remaining subtreatment, it was individually optimal to maintain the current
management method throughout the duration of the ten-round game. The ordering of the
subtreatments was held consistent for all sessions in order to ensure that whatever
information players may have gleaned about the game itself from subtreatment to
subtreatment was a consistent factor. Players were unsure in any given game of the
individually optimum decision, thus maintaining within-subjects information uncertainty
over the course of the three subtreatments each player completed.
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In each subtreatment, players earned a set profit per year if they chose to maintain
the status quo (Psq). An upfront payment, or investment, was required in order to adopt
the new method (Ibmp), reflected as a negative profit immediately following the year the
adoption decision was made (A). In subtreatments 1 and 3, players ultimately earned
more profit after adoption (Pbmp > Psq), meaning that adopting early in those
subtreatments represented the best financial decision. In subtreatment 2, Pbmp = Psq, so
switching to the new method resulted in a net loss in profit (the investment did not pay
off). It is common that when changing management methods, farmers may experience a
time lag before the management method becomes profitable. To model this dynamic,
subtreatments 1 and 2 included a one-year lag, such that in the second year following
adoption (A+1), the player earned zero profit (Py2 = 0). After the one-year profitability
lag, the farm returned to profitability, earning an unwavering profit (Pbmp) during all
remaining years (A+2 … 10). Subtreatment 3 differed in that it did not include a
profitability gap, with the farm enterprise returning to profitability (Pbmp) the year after
the adoption decision was made (A+1). Using the payoff dynamics variables for each
subtreatment (Table 2 below), and where A represents the round a player makes the
choice to adopt (if it is made at all), the cumulative profit for an individual player from a
ten-round game can be determined using the following formula:

10

𝐴−1

(∑ 𝑃𝑠𝑞 ) − 𝐼𝑏𝑚𝑝 + 𝑃𝑦2 + (∑ 𝑃𝑏𝑚𝑝 )
1

𝑃𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 = (𝑃 × 8) − 𝐼
𝑠𝑞
𝑏𝑚𝑝 + 𝑃𝑦2
(𝑃𝑠𝑞 × 9) − 𝐼𝑏𝑚𝑝
{𝑃𝑠𝑞 × 10

63

𝐴+2

𝑖𝑓 1 ≤ 𝐴 ≤ 7
𝑖𝑓 𝐴 = 9
𝑖𝑓 𝐴 = 10
𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

Table 2: Payoff Dynamics for Each Subtreatment
Subtreatment 1
Subtreatment 2
Subtreatment 3

Psq
$0.50
$0.75
$0.50

Ibmp
$1.50
$1.00
$3.00

Py2
$0.00
$0.00
$1.50

Pbmp
$1.50
$0.75
$1.50

Individually Optimal Decision
Adopt New Method at Round 1
Never Adopt New Method
Adopt New Method at Round 1

Data from each session were retrieved from the Python output files and imported
into IBM SPSS 22 software for statistical analysis. For analysis of innovation diffusion
characteristics, including innovation diffusion curves, data were aggregated by
subtreatment, and the ratio of adoptees to non-adoptees at each round was tabulated for
each network configuration. For analysis of network performance, the optimum profit
was calculated for each subtreatment, and the distance to optimum profit, in dollars, was
generated for each player in each subtreatment. As the distance to optimum was
determined to be distributed non-normally, non-parametric significance tests were
utilized. A Mann-Whitney test was used to determine the effect on player performance
of the presence or absence of a seed within the trio networks. A Spearman’s rho
correlation was performed in order to analyze whether the total degree of a social
network was a statistical predictor of the performance of its players, based on distance to
optimum profit. Note that for all statistical analyses, the automated decisions of the nonhuman seed players were not included in the data.

2.4. Results
Alchian’s (1950) decision-making heuristics, as well as Rogers’ (2010)
observations on innovation diffusion, are both supported by our experimental data.
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Firstly, our data show clear evidence of trial-and-error behavior through the dynamics of
early adoption. Overall, we find that an average of 50.6% of participants adopted in
round 1 of each game, before any ex-post monitoring of peer actions was possible. Early
adoption behavior in this experiment can be explained in two ways. In the first game, it
would appear that early-adopters relied purely on the trial-and-error heuristic. However,
with one or two games under their belts, early adopters in the second or third game could
have been using either trial-and-error or backwards-looking imitation, relying upon the
successes of peers in previous games to guide their behavior. In this experimental
context, due to game-to-game differences in payoff dynamics, backwards-looking
imitation may have enabled some degree of economic success, since the individuallyoptimal behavior in subtreatments 1 and 3 were identical. However, forwards-looking
imitation based on ex-post monitoring of peer decisions, while more computationallycostly, enabled better decision making in Subtreatment 2, which did not have a payoffanalogous game upon which to base backwards-looking imitation.
2.4.1. Results for Seeded and Unseeded Trio Networks: Significance of the
Availability of Perfect Information within a Social Network
Our data strongly suggest that many participants did successfully use a strategy of
adaptation based on forward-looking imitation to inform their decisions. Within-game
information diffusion can be seen clearly by examining the diffusion curves of the
Seeded and Unseeded Trios (Figures 2-4). Players in subtreatments 1 and 3 (in which
adoption of the new method was economically beneficial) achieved very high levels of
diffusion by round 10. By contrast, the innovation curves for subtreatment 2, in which
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adoption was not ideal, plateaued around 65-70%, after which players who had not yet
adopted generally refrained from doing so for the remainder of the game. We can assume
that this behavior is based largely on the ex-post monitoring and subsequent imitation of
their non-adopting peers.

Figure 2: Subtreatment 1 Diffusion Curve for Seeded Trios and Unseeded Trios.
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Figure 3: Subtreatment 2 Diffusion Curve for Seeded Trios and Unseeded Trios.

Figure 4: Subtreatment 3 Diffusion Curve for Seeded Trios and Unseeded Trios.
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It is interesting to note that in subtreatment 3, which did not include the
unprofitable lag year in its payoff dynamics, the diffusion curve proceeds much more
quickly. Players could see the investment into the new management method pay off for
their peers after only two rounds, rather than having to wait three rounds in subtreatment
1. Thus, while the Seeded Trios achieved 100% adoption in each case, in subtreatment 3
we observe complete adoption as early as round 4, whereas in subtreatment 1 this plateau
did not occur until round 8. This observation corroborates theories from the field of
system dynamics, which suggest that the rapidity of information feedback within a
system can have profound effects on how that system evolves and changes (Wright &
Meadows, 2012). Observing this effect in an experimental setting is a powerful
corroboration of those theories.
The diffusion curve for subtreatment 2 provides a glimpse into the diffusion
characteristics associated with high quality information in a network in more depth.
Recall that in subtreatment 2 the individually-optimal decision was to never adopt the
new management method. Not knowing at the time that it was a bad economic decision,
we observe that 57% of the players in the Seeded Trios networks adopted early in this
subtreatment. However, the diffusion curve for this subtreatment suggests that the other
players learned very quickly from the mistakes of their peers. The ability to weigh the
poor results of early adopters against the relative success of non-adopters, such as the
ideally-behaving seed, may explain why the diffusion curve plateaus at 65% adoption and
does not increase throughout the remaining duration of the game. Among the Unseeded
Trios players, we observe that social learning did not proceed nearly as efficiently.
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Despite having a much lower rate of early adoption, players in the unseeded networks
continued to adopt—a poor economic decision in this case—such that instead of
plateauing, the unseeded players ultimately surpassed the adoption level of the seeded
players. These observations support the hypothesis that the insertion of high-quality
information within a peer network, for example by training and equipping specific
farmers to serve as peer models, may bolster the decision-making performance of others
in their peer networks due to the imitation effects seen in this experimental context.

Figure 5: Mean Distance from Optimum Profit per Game among Seeded Trios and
Unseeded Trios. Error bars represent standard error.

Diffusion dynamics in our data are also apparent in the observation that the
inclusion of the seed’s perfect behavior seems to have strongly influenced the imitation
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behavior of other actors in the network, spurring better average decision-making amongst
those players. Across all subtreatments, the Seeded Trios consistently outperformed the
Unseeded Trios. This effect is apparent in the diffusion curves for each Subtreatment
(Figures 2-4), as well as in the players’ average distance from optimum profit in each
game (Figure 5). Players in the Unseeded Trios networks averaged $1.96 from optimum
per game, whereas those in the Seeded Trios networks averaged just $1.39. A MannWhitney significance test on these data confirm a significant difference in performance
between players in the Seeded Trios and Unseeded Trios networks (Mann-Whitney U =
893.5; Z = -1.868; Asymptotic Significance (2-tailed) = .062).
2.4.2. The Influence of Network Degree on Mean Distance from Optimum Profit
across All Experimental Networks
The presence or absence of perfect information within a peer network, while a
marked effect in our data, only partially explains the information diffusion phenomena
present in our data. Despite the fact that players within all seeded networks had access to
the same ideal information, aggregating results by network degree shows that simply
having more peers in a social network also facilitates better economic decision-making.
In short, size matters when farm managers are faced with management decisions and
must rely upon the information available to them from their own experience and that of
their peers.
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Figure 6: Mean Distance from Optimum Profit per Game by Network Total Degree. Error
bars represent standard error.

Examining the mean distance from optimum profit per game for players within
networks of varying degree, across all three Subtreatments, provides an overarching
metric of network-level performance. The assumption here is that the quality of
participants’ economic decisions is based at least in part on information diffusion flowing
from peer-to-peer imitation. This is a relatively safe assumption to make because, as we
have already seen, there is strong evidence of peer-to-peer imitation in the data. Figure 6
shows that, overall, players in networks of degree 2 performed worst, averaging $2.12
less than optimum profit per game, whereas players in networks of degree 12, the
maximum level of connectivity in our experiment, performed best, averaging just $1.28
less than optimum per game. Correlating the network degree with distance from
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optimum profit across all games in our experiment yields a statistically-significant
negative correlation (Spearman’s rho Correlation Coefficient = -0.148; Significance (2tailed) = .018). It would appear that in this experimental context—in which financial
outcomes are uncertain, and thus optimizing is not a viable economic strategy—economic
agents with more imitable peers in their social networks are more likely to make good
economic decisions.
Drawing together the results demonstrating superior performance of the Seeded
over the Unseeded Trios with the results demonstrating better performance within
networks of higher degree, we may make an interesting observation that lends depth to
these findings. Recall that players in the pair networks were connected to only the
ideally-performing seed, on whom they could theoretically rely as a model providing
perfect information. Upon first glance, it would seem reasonable to assume that, since
the only information available to these players was perfect information, players in the
pair networks had the highest overall quality information of all network configurations.
However, as we have seen, players in the pair networks performed the worst; worse even
than the unseeded trios, who had only the trial-and-error behavior of their human peers
upon which to base decisions. One possible explanation for this finding is that higher
numbers of peers in a social network may increase decision-making confidence in
environments where economic decisions are based on imitation rather than optimization.
This suggests that increasing peer-to-peer connectivity is valuable in a way that is
independent from information quality.
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However, another interpretation of these results requires a different look at the
concept of information quality. In an environment of uncertainty, even perfect
information such as that provided by the seed may only be seen as worthy of imitation
when set in contrast to other, less-ideal information. If this were true, then the presence
of a few “bad” decision-makers within a network may paradoxically foster better
economic outcomes for the network as a whole by highlighting the “good” decisionmaking of other network members, leading to imitation and enhanced diffusion of those
good decisions. This would confirm Rogers’ (2010) assertion that effective diffusion
takes place in networks with a certain degree of heterophily. Networks of higher degree
can be assumed in the context of our experiment to be relatively more heterophilic than
smaller networks, within which it may be impossible to guess whether a peer’s decisions
are truly worthy of imitation due to a participant’s inability to monitor the consequences
of the opposite course of action. While this effect remains speculative without further
research, it may help explain why larger networks, in which a wider range of decisionmaking could be monitored, generally performed better in our experiment.

2.5. Conclusions
The network-level performance benefits associated with the inclusion of a seed
player suggest that the presence of a single farmer within a network whose economic
decisions are better than his or her peers may spur others to imitation: “a rising tide lifts
all boats.” This could be operationalized by establishing model farms within existing
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farmer peer networks and facilitating information exchange between farmers through
mechanisms such as Farmer Field Schools (FFS).
The observation that both homophily and heterophily may be important where
facilitation of innovation diffusion is a goal has real-world policy implications in the
realm this experiment was designed to model. In a real-world setting, network-level
homophily would entail farm operations that are relatively similar with regard to
characteristics such as scale, infrastructure, available land, and the marketplace within
which they operate. This type of homophily, common among farmers whose peer
networks are based on physical location, establishes trust that “if it worked for my
neighbor, it will work for me.”
Yet our results also suggest that it may be equally important that farmers be
familiarized with the operations of their less-successful peers. If larger networks tend to
encompass higher levels of heterophily, it will be more likely that a wider spectrum of
management choices will be used within these networks. Rather than being a liability,
the presence of underperforming peers may actually foster beneficial imitation by
building confidence that imitation of successful peers represents a good economic
decision. This suggests that, in order to maximize positive information externalities and
social learning, farmer network leaders should endeavor to increase the size and diversity
of farmer networks. Peer-to-peer engagement opportunities should then occur at a
diversity of farms, not just at successful “model farms.” The extent to which this
conclusion holds warrants future study, as there may be a point when networks become
too large and/or too diverse for efficient diffusion to occur.
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CHAPTER 3: THE DAIRY FARM TRANSITIONS AGENT BASED MODEL:
ANALYZING THE IMPACT OF PEER-TO-PEER LEARNING ON
INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC AND ECOLOGICAL SUSTAINABILITY

3.1. Abstract
Recognizing the need to simultaneously address both dairy farm viability and the
negative environmental externalities arising from certain elements of dairy production,
the Dairy Farm Transitions Agent Based Model (DFTABM) was developed. The model
was calibrated using primarily USDA Census of Agriculture data, and predicts factors
such as farm profitability, attrition, and soil loss under varying assumptions concerning
farmer peer network connectivity and the frequency of peer-to-peer learning. Nine
treatments were assessed, which differed according to farmer connectivity, frequency of
peer-to-peer learning, and the inclusion of a soil loss reduction tax credit. Overall, it was
found that high rates of emulation coupled with high rates of connectivity, especially
targeted connectivity among smaller farms, yielded the best balance of farm viability and
reduction in soil loss. The addition of a tax credit for reduction in soil loss had no clear
correlation with reductions in soil loss figures generated by the model. Policy
implications from this study include the finding that direct payment schemes for
reduction in environmental harm may not always be a viable solution, and that programs
to enhance peer-to-peer learning opportunities, especially among proprietors of smaller
farms, may present an effective and relatively affordable means by which to effect longterm change.

3.2. Introduction
3.2.1. Policy Problem Statement
As a state that cleaves strongly to both its agricultural roots and its legacy of
environmental stewardship, Vermont is currently faced with a difficult pair of heavilyintertwined policy issues. Farm viability continues to be a problem, especially amongst
small and mid-scale dairy producers, which have exited the market at an alarming rate
(Parsons, 2010). At the same time, water quality impacts resultant from agricultural
runoff have come to the forefront, with the State’s waterways suffering from frequent
toxic algae blooms in recent years (State of Vermont, 2014). A number of policy
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interventions are in their early stages of implementation, primarily revolving around
increased regulation and financial incentivization of Best Management Practice adoption
(Shumlin, 2014).
Research suggests that for many small and mid-scale dairy producers, a
management method called rotational grazing may offer a partial solution to both
problems. Farmers who have switched to this system find that farm-level profitability
and economic resiliency are generally enhanced, driven largely by lower production costs
and less exposure to volatile commodity markets (Kriegl, 2005; Hanson et al. 2009;
Gillespie et al., 2009). And, because of the land use change from row-crop to pasture,
harmful agricultural runoff may be drastically reduced (Stone, 1996; VDEC, 2006). A
study analyzing barriers to the adoption of rotational-grazing found that, whereas prior to
adoption the perceived severity of barriers was high, after adoption few if any of these
barriers presented an actual concern (Winsten et al., 2011b). It would appear, then, that
the biggest barrier to the adoption of rotational grazing may in fact be the uncertainty
associated with the adoption of a novel production method.
Social learning has proven to be an effective model for understanding the ways in
which the adoption of new agricultural management techniques diffuses through natural
social networks (Ryan & Gross, 1943; Foster & Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley & Udry,
2001; Munshi, 2004; Young, 2009; Rebaudo & Dangles, 2013). Given the pressing need
to reduce or eliminate the environmental externalities that arise from certain agricultural
practices, there has been increasing interest in understanding the processes by which
farmers decide to adopt environmentally sustainable Best Management Practices (BMPs),
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studies which affirm the centrality of social learning for farmers’ adoption of BMPs
(Baerenklau, 2005; Baumgart-Getz, Prokopy, & Floress, 2012; McCann et al., 2014; Zia,
2014). Observing the successful results of one’s peers aids in overcoming barriers to
adoption that arise from uncertainty about new agricultural technologies.
In light of the preceding observations, it becomes clear that the diffusion of
information from farmer to farmer within existing peer networks may have deep and
lasting impacts upon the agricultural landscape. The complexity inherent in Coupled
Human and Natural Systems (CHANS) makes an agent-based model an ideal tool to
plumb these depths. The DFTABM model and the associated experiments described in
this paper examine the relationships between the size, constitution, and informationsharing qualities of farmer peer networks; and desired policy outcomes at both the farm
and the watershed level. The efficacy of peer-based policy interventions is compared
with performance-based financial incentive programs. Results from these experiments
shed light on lingering questions surrounding the extent to which these types of policy
programs may foster beneficial innovation, specifically concerning key agricultural
practices which are known to enhance farm viability and reduce negative environmental
externalities. Understanding peer-to-peer diffusion dynamics, such as the mechanisms by
which BMP adoption proliferates among farmers, may provide clues as to how
policymakers could leverage existing farmer networks, or establish new ones, to further
policy goals.
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3.2.2. Optimizing Intervention-Driven Change Using ABMs
Agent-based computer modeling has proven an effective means by which to
observe the complex emergent properties associated with the relatively simple actions of
a group of independent actors, or agents. Once agents are programmed with a set of
decision rules, they are placed into a simulated environment, and often connected to one
another in networks (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Ostrom, 2005). Because model outputs
are derived from the collective action of many agents acting individually, phenomena
may emerge which are difficult if not impossible to predict by other means (Ostrom,
2005).
Two distinct goals may be discerned from the existing literature on ABM
research. The first is what has come to be known as generative social science, whereby
the value of a modeling endeavor is largely to enhance scientific understanding of the
mechanisms underlying social phenomena that are observed in the real world. (Epstein,
1999; 2006; Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). The second goal is to forecast the behavior of
complex systems in order to guide decision-making in the present. Under such
experimental conditions, a model must first be precisely calibrated such that model
outputs correspond with expected real-world results in a baseline condition, known as the
“baseline change” (Ostrom, 2012). Interventions may then be modeled, and results at the
whole-system level may be observed (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000). For example, models
have been used to predict human population settlement patterns (Epstein, 2006;
Campbell, Kim, & Eckerd, 2014; Kim, Campbell, & Eckerd, 2014), transportation project
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prioritization (Zia & Koliba, 2013), and the utilization of common-pool resources such as
water for irrigation (Janssen, 2007).
A subset of ABMs analyzes and predicts the effects of public policy interventions
intended to address specific governance aims. In such models, the agents’ decision rules
are modulated by government programs intended to incentivize certain behaviors, a
phenomenon known as “intervention-driven change.” There is a growing body of
literature in which agent-based models have been used to examine the mechanisms
behind public policy implementation (Zia & Koliba, 2013; Janssen & Ostrom, 2006;
Maroulis & Wilensky, 2014; Axelrod, 1997; Lempert, 2002; Choi & Robertson, 2014).
Agent based modeling is a valuable tool to model governance systems where behavior
change is a primary goal, because the agents may be programmed with decision rules
reflecting the inherent complexities of actual human actors, such as path dependence,
which affects the propensity with which actors may adopt new technologies (Koliba,
Meek, & Zia, 2010; Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Ostrom, 2005).
Agent-based models also lend themselves well to the study of agent behavior
within networks. Endogenous agent decision rules, coupled with modeled policy
interventions, may impact the extent to which partnerships between agents are formed or
sustained. The structures of networks have been shown to impinge heavily upon policy
outcomes in a number of policy arenas, and a growing body of literature defines the
theoretical underpinnings behind these interactions (Koliba, Meek, & Zia, 2010; O’Toole,
1997; Provan & Milward, 1995; Salamon, 2002). Studies have also begun to put theories
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of networked governance into practice, for example in the implementation of
environmental policy programs (Koontz et al., 2004).
One network characteristic with strong links to network outcomes is the level of
similarity between actors. Actors with similar characteristics may form linkages through
bonding social capital, which stabilize over time, a process known as homophily (Burt,
1992). Alternatively, actors may form linkages with actors with differing characteristics,
thereby increasing bridging capital, a process known as heterophily (Granovetter, 1973,
1983; Burt, 1992). The level of homophily and heterophily within a networked system
has been found to correlate with network outcomes (Burt, 2000). Research has also cited
the balance between homophily and heterophily as a critical factor in the efficient
diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2010). Finally, research from the theory of behavioral
economics confirms the importance of network size and diversity on the facilitation of
information diffusion within peer networks (Chapter 2).
An inherent challenge of building a calibrated agent-based model to assess
intervention-driven change is the difficulty of acquiring adequate calibration data. This is
especially the case for models with high context specificity, which are precisely
calibrated to analyze a single area of study (Janssen & Ostrom, 2006). Often, data must
be drawn from a large variety of sources such as databases, existing statistical data, and
academic literature. To surmount this challenge, a Knowledge Management approach
can be valuable in cases where a large amount of disparate data must be drawn together.
This approach requires first rigorously evaluating the data that will be required to build
out the model, such as baseline parameters, and the formulation of agent decision rules
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(North & Macal, 2007). Existing datasets may then be merged with knowledge gleaned
from human input, such that the final model represents available tacit and explicit
knowledge to the maximum possible extent (Alavi & Leidner, 2001).

3.3. Methods
Using AnyLogic 7.1 computer modeling software, the Dairy Farm Transitions
Agent Based Model (DFTABM) was developed to evaluate farm viability and
environmental outcomes in Vermont’s dairy industry. Baseline assumptions can be
compared to scenarios varying economic forecasts, farmer decision-making
characteristics, and/or the implementation of public policies aimed at increasing
profitability and decreasing ecological impacts. Financial incentive-based policies may
be compared with policies that increase and change the nature of peer to peer
connectivity. Model outputs indicate the effect of setup scenarios upon farm
management decisions that carry both financial consequences for the farmers, as well as
watershed-level ecological ramifications.
The behavior of farmers, codified in the model as DairyFarm agents, is driven by
macroeconomic trends including the cost of inputs such as feed and the price of milk sold
on the open market, Federal and State agricultural policies, and localized peer-to-peer
interaction between farmers. The model setup screen allows the user to alter variables
associated with each of these categories in order to assess land-use, farm viability, and
ecological outcomes under various scenarios (see Appendix 2). A main view then allows
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the user to observe land-use and farm-management changes, and track statistical
outcomes as the model runs (see Appendix 3).
3.3.1. DairyFarm Agent Initialization
Distribution of Farm Typologies
DairyFarm agents are initialized at model runtime according to observed realworld distributions of dairy farm characteristics in Vermont. The majority of the data
used to initialize agents comes from the 2102 US Census of Agriculture (USDA NASS,
2012d).

Table 3: Vermont Dairy Farms by Typology: Distribution and Key Statistics
Family Farms
Small: GCFI < $350,000
Farming is Primary
Large-Scale:
Occupation
GCFI > $1,000,000
Moderate Mid-Size:
Sales:
GCFI
Large:
Low Sales: $150,000 $350,000 $1,000,000 Very Large: NonOff-Farm
<
to
to
to
$5,000,000 Family
Retirement Occupation $150,000 $349,999 $999,999 $4,999,999
+
Farms
Percent Vermont
9%
7%
21%
24%
21%
12%
1%
5%
Dairies
Avg. Gross
$13,758 $10,313 $32,290 $228,719 $538,286 $2,122,917 $8,756,830 $308,943
Income
1-9 64
50
93
1
9
10-49 19
21
113
59
2
9
Size
50-99 11
9
20
81
68
15
of
100-199
1
17
130
6
12
Herd
200-499
27
75
5
500+
43
8
7
Avg. Acreage 116
92
140
338
531
1163
3658
315
Percent Organic 4
4
11
26
15
7
0
8
Note: GCFI indicates Gross Cash Farm Income, which includes the farm operator’s sales of crops and
livestock, fees for delivering commodities under production contracts, government payments, and farmrelated income. Off-Farm Occupation indicates that the operators report a primary occupation other than
farming. Non-Family Farm indicates that the operator or persons related to the operator do not own a
majority of the business. (USDA NASS, 2012d)
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The census of agriculture divides farms into eight typologies according to sales
figures, land use, and income characteristics. These typologies, along with their
distribution in the Vermont dairy farm population, and several measures used in
initialization of the model, are listed in Table 3 above.
At model runtime, The Dairy Farm Transitions ABM relies upon statistical
distributions, based on distributions given in Table 3, to assign DairyFarm agents to one
of the eight typologies identified by the US census of agriculture. Once typologies have
been assigned, an initialization function imbues each agent with land use and
management characteristics according to the corresponding census data. The farm
characteristics generated from the census data for each agent include total acreage, size of
milking herd, harvested cropland acreage, cropland pasture acreage, woodland pasture
acreage, permanent pasture acreage, hay/haylage acreage, and organic certification status.
USDA census data also indicate that, as of 2012, there were 187 dairy farms operating in
Franklin County (USDA NASS, 2012c). Correspondingly, the total number of
DairyFarm agents the model generates is set by default to 187, although the number of
farms in the simulation may be changed at model runtime.
Off-Farm Income
According to the NASS definitions, farms which fall into either the Retirement or
Off-Farm Occupation typological categories draw only a portion of their income from
farm operations (USDA NASS, 2012d). Many of these farms may operate at a loss, yet
stay in business due to external sources of revenue. Accurate modeling of farm viability
requires that this outside income be factored into farm-level financial calculations for
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these farm typologies. To accommodate this dynamic, farms falling into these categories
are initialized with a set level of monthly income which covers a proportion of potential
losses from farm operations, up to a maximum of between $4000 and $8000 per month
for off-farm occupation, or between $100 and $1000 per month for retirement farms.
Agent Localization
Because the actual physical location of each specific dairy farm within Franklin
County is not available in any public dataset, DairyFarm agents in the Dairy Transitions
ABM do not represent actual farms. However, care was taken to distribute agents
spatially within a GIS map of Franklin County according to real-world land use patterns.
Land use data were acquired from the Vermont Center for Geographic Information in the
form of GIS shapefiles (Vermont Center for Geographic Information, 2015). ESRI
ArcMap software was then used to generate a merged shapefile representing all the land
inside Franklin County used to grow either corn, soy, hay, or pasture; the primary land
uses associated with dairy farming. This merged shapefile was loaded into AnyLogic,
and used to define Franklin County’s dairy farming region. At model runtime, the agents
are stochastically distributed within this farming region.
Peer Network Connectivity
The Dairy Farm Transitions ABM initializes with a distance-based peer network
representing connections between neighboring farms. By default, the peer network
connection distance is set to four miles—meaning that all farms within a four mile radius
of any given farm are linked together—however this assumption can be adjusted by the
model user at runtime to evaluate the effect of network size on model outcomes.
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Additionally, it has been noted that networks generally exhibit a certain degree of
homophily, or similarity between peers, especially when they have existed for some time
(Burt, 1992; 2000). In the Dairy Transitions ABM baseline setup, this is accounted for
by stipulating that agents are only considered peers if their operations are of a similar
size. By default, the model assumes an emulable peer to have a herd size between ½ and
2 times that of a given agent. Whether or not to include this stipulation, along with the
ratio of milking herd size required for peer status, may be adjusted by the user at runtime.
All DairyFarm agents within the connection distance radius, and meeting the size
similarity criterion, are connected by gray lines, and form the pool of DairyFarm agents
upon which an agent may base emulation decisions.
3.3.2. Agent Decision-Making
DairyFarm agents’ primary motivation within the context of this model is
assumed to be maintenance or enhancement of profitability. To this end, agents act
according to three primary mechanisms: (a) trial-and-error behavior, (b) adjustment to
farm management practices in the event of economic decline, and (c) emulation of other
farmers within a peer network. These actions are controlled programmatically using a
state-chart incorporating a number of decision nodes (Figure 7). Specifics of these action
mechanisms are detailed below.
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Figure 7: DairyFarm Agent Statechart

Trial-and-Error Behavior
Trial-and-error behavior is a fundamental strategy when economic decisions must
be made in the absence of complete information (Alchian, 1950; Rhode & Stegeman,
2001). Because incomplete information is a fundamental property associated with
operating in a price-taking commodity market, a number of trial-and-error behaviors have
been modeled in the DFTABM. Agents enter the “Trial and Error” state at a rate of once
per year, since land-use and other major decisions are generally made prior to the start of
each growing season. By default, the model assumes that 50% of farmers may engage in
trial-and-error behavior regarding farm management and land use each season. However,
this number is alterable by the user at runtime in order to assess varying assumptions
pursuant to the frequency with which farmers actually use trial and error as a decision
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making strategy. Sub-functions within the trial-and-error code are outlined below. These
sub-functions are each assessed in turn whenever a DairyFarm agent enters the Trial and
Error state.
Increase Herd Size
Data show a general trend toward increasing herd sizes on dairy farms, with the
average herd size increasing steadily from 85 in 1992 to 191 as of 2012 (USDA NASS
1997c; 2012c). For this reason, a primary component of agents’ trial-and-error behavior
is to increase herd size. Provided the agent has sufficient capital on hand, it is assumed
that 50% of the times it enters the trial-and-error state, it will increase its herd size by up
to 5% of its current herd size, paying a set market rate for each new milker. Two
assumptions limit the growth of herd sizes. First, a cap of between 2000 and 3000
milkers is placed on farms operating at the top end of the scale, to account for the
fragmented nature of Vermont’s geography limiting farm growth in many cases. Second,
a rotational grazing farm will not increase its herd size beyond its ability to produce 80%
of its feed on-farm.
Purchase Additional Land
Accounting for the rising trend in average acreage on Vermont dairies (USDA
NASS, 1997c; 2002c; 2007c; 2012c), it is also assumed that 25% of the times a
DairyFarm agent enters the trial-and-error state, it will choose to purchase additional
land. Provided it has sufficient operating capital, it will increase its land base by up to
5%. If the farm is primarily growing crops on its land, it will purchase additional
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cropland, whereas it will purchase additional pastureland if it is a primarily grass-based
operation. The price of agricultural land is set by a global parameter.
Rotational Grazing
Rotational grazing is an intensive system of grazing which, if skillfully practiced,
can significantly increase the forage yield from a given grazed acreage. While many
farmers learn of this practice from its successful use by peers, some also discover it
independently, for example through the internet, university extension services, or other
resources, and adopt it through trial-and-error. It is assumed that the farms that turn to
this intensive grazing practice already have a significant portion of their land in pasture or
hay. Additionally, as herd sizes increase beyond about 150-175 milkers, rotational
grazing becomes less likely due to logistical challenges. The DFTABM captures this
dynamic by assigning a 10% probability that an agent entering the trial-and-error state
with at least 80% of its acreage in forage, producing at least 80% of its feed on-farm, and
with under 175 milkers, will adopt rotational grazing. The model also stipulates that
farms which had been using rotational grazing, but which increased their herd size
beyond 200, or decreased the feed produced on farm to below 65%, will no longer use
rotational grazing.
Organic Certification
Organic dairy farming has become increasingly popular in recent years, largely
due to the potential to earn steadier returns, driven by the lower volatility of organic milk
prices. Once again, many farmers choose to certify organic after hearing of the success
of a peer, but some make the decision independently through trial-and-error. Due to the
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pasture rule stipulating that 30% of an organic farm’s feed must be from pasture, farms
are more likely to independently certify organic if they are already producing a higher
amount of their own forage. Upon entering the trial-and-error state, the model assigns a
0.5% annual chance that agents with between 40% and 70% forage acreage will
independently choose to certify organic, and a 1% chance for agents with greater than
70% forage acreage. However, agents are only able to adopt organic practices if they
have sufficient capital reserves to pay for all of their acreage to be certified, according to
a global parameter for per-acre organic certification cost.
Adjustment Due to Financial Pressure
The yearly financial calculation function includes a provision for farms facing
significant financial pressures to take emergency corrective measures. If an agent is in
significant debt—defined as being in the red by more than the value of its herd—it will
sell off some of its assets according to the following assumed heuristics. First, the agent
will sell off acreage, receiving the market price for agricultural land in Vermont—another
global parameter—for each acre, until it is out of debt. If the farm is primarily cropbased, the agent will sell off pastureland, and vice-versa. If it is still underwater, it will
then sell off a portion of its herd, adding the market price for each cow—defined as ½ the
global parameter for the price of a milker in its prime—to its capital reserves until it is
out of debt. An agent will only sell off 25% of its landbase and 25% of its herd in any
given year, however, because otherwise it would have no chance to rebound during the
following season.
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Emulation Behavior
Making financial decisions in the absence of complete information often takes the
form of emulation of other firms operating in a similar financial environment (Alchian,
1950; Rhode & Stegeman, 2001). Qualitative research conducted as part of the
Knowledge Management approach used to gather data for this model confirms that peer
emulation is a strong driver of decision-making in the context of Vermont’s dairy
industry. Out of the six grass-based, rotational grazing farmers interviewed, five had
either learned of rotational grazing from a peer, or been encouraged to use it as a result of
observing the successes of a peer. These peers were generally neighboring farmers or
family members who were also farmers. Among Vermont farmers, at least, it would
appear that peer-to-peer learning serves as an important channel by which new farm
practices may be learned, and, perhaps even more importantly, by which uncertainties
surrounding the likely results of adopting a new practice may be diminished. In addition
to anecdotal evidence, behavioral economics research suggests that a primary way
farmers make land use and farm management decisions is by emulating the successful
decisions of their peers, with the size of peer networks playing a significant role in
facilitating the efficient diffusion of novel techniques (Chapter 2). The Dairy Farm
Transitions Model simulates these dynamics by including a mechanism for DairyFarm
agents to compare their own profitability, land use, and management methods against
others in their peer networks.
An event function is executed annually which iterates through connected agents,
and determines which is the most profitable. If it is determined that the net annual profit
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of an agent’s most profitable peer is greater than that agent’s own net annual profit,
emulation behavior will be considered. Under baseline conditions, the model assumes
that farmers will consider emulating a successful peer with a frequency of once every two
years. The model further assumes that 25% of farmers who consider peer emulation will
actually carry through and make adjustments to their own management practices based on
the actions of that successful peer. Both the frequency of emulation, and the rate at
which agents actually carry through with emulation, can be altered at model runtime to
assess alternate assumptions or experimentally examine the effects of varying degrees of
peer emulation on model outcomes.
Land use emulation behavior in the Dairy Transitions Model takes the form of
either increasing or decreasing the acreage that is devoted to forage versus corn silage
production, or adopting or discontinuing rotational grazing. Farm management emulation
is operationalized by a DairyFarm agent deciding to increase or decrease its herd size, or
certify or discontinue organic production. In order for an agent to determine whether a
successful peer’s feeding strategy or its herd size is more worthy of emulation,
calculations are performed which generate ratios between the percent of an agent’s farm
that is in forage production versus that of the successful peer, as well as between the
agent’s herd size versus that of the successful peer. A greater ratio indicates a greater
difference in practices between the agent and its peer. The agent will emulate the factor
that is deemed to represent the stronger difference between itself and its successful peer.
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On-Farm Feed Production Emulation
If it is determined that the successful peer is achieving its differential success
primarily through its land use practices, an agent will adjust its own land use practices
accordingly. If the successful peer has more of its land in crops, the agent will increase
its own crop production, transitioning between 5% and 10% of its arable land that is
currently in use as pasture to crops, and paying a set cost per acre for transitional
activities such as plowing and fertilizing, defined by a global parameter. If the successful
peer has more of its land in forage, the agent will transition between 5% and 10% of its
cropland to pasture, once again paying a set cost per acre for transitional tasks such as
pasture seeding, also defined by a global parameter.
Rotational Grazing Emulation
If an agent decides to base its emulation on land use, an additional decision node
allows that agent to emulate the rotational grazing practices of its successful peer. If the
agent is not currently using rotational grazing, and the peer, who is using the method, is
found to be at least twice as profitable, emulation of rotational grazing will be considered.
In order to carry through with adoption, an agent must fulfill certain criteria: it must have
less than 175 milkers, have more than 50% of its acreage in forage, and have a landbase
that can support at least 80% of its herd’s nutrition through forage feed. If all these
conditions are met, the agent will adopt rotational grazing, transitioning all its harvested
cropland acreage to pastureland, and paying a set price per acre, according to a global
parameter, to establish rotational grazing infrastructure such as fencing, laneways, and
watering systems. Similarly, if an agent is currently using rotational grazing, and a peer
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who is not is found to be at least twice as profitable, the agent will discontinue use of
rotational grazing, and immediately begin to transition a portion of its grazing land back
to crops.
Herd Size Emulation
If it is determined that the successful peer is achieving success primarily due to a
large difference in herd size, the agent will act to decrease or increase the size of its own
herd. If the successful peer has a larger milking herd, to the extent to which the agent has
sufficient capital, the agent will increase the size of its own herd by 10% to 30% by
purchasing additional milkers. If the successful peer has a smaller herd, the agent will
likewise sell off between 10% and 30% of its herd. Agents purchasing milkers pay a set
price per head according to a global parameter. Agents selling milkers receive half of
that price per head, to account for depreciation associated with an aging herd.
Organic Certification Status Emulation
An agent may also emulate its successful peer by either certifying or
discontinuing organic production. If the organic status of the successful peer is opposite
that of the emulating agent, and the successful peer is at least twice as profitable as the
emulating agent, there is a 5% chance that instead of emulating land use or herd size, the
agent will choose to emulate the successful peer’s organic status. If the successful peer is
certified organic and the agent is not, provided the agent has sufficient operating capital
to certify its harvested acreage, the agent will choose to emulate the successful peer by
certifying organic. If the successful peer is not certified organic, while the emulating
agent is, the agent will discontinue its organic certification status.
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3.3.3. Economic Model
Economic Projection Engine
The Dairy Farm Transitions ABM can be set up to run going forward from any
date after 1989. While the model date is between 1989 and 2013, the model uses actual
historical data for both farm gate milk prices and feed costs (Gould, 2015a; 2015b).
Once the model time enters 2014, historical data is no longer available, so the model’s
economic projection engine takes over to generate realistic milk price and feed cost data
for each month based on historical trends, as well as user-input assumptions.
Milk Price Projections
The model uses a compounding interest formula which closely mirrors the
historical annual inflation in price of both organic and conventional milk, set by default
to 2% annually (Gould, 2015b). In addition to a fixed rate of inflation, it has been
observed that milk prices tend to follow cyclic trends. In the case of conventional milk,
in particular, these cycles, occurring roughly every three years, have become increasingly
large in recent years. Organic milk prices, by contrast, tend to be much steadier (Su &
Cook, 2015). For farmers operating on tight margins, these fluctuations can create a
“cost price squeeze” which significantly impacts farm viability. The model’s price
forecasting engine captures these dynamics by establishing a cyclic variation in line with
historic trends. In keeping with the stochastic nature of real-world economics, the model
also imposes a +/- 2% variation in price on a monthly basis. By default, for conventional
milk, the price is assumed to swing by an average of 18% per three-year cycle, whereas
for organic milk the swing averages 5% per cycle (Su & Cook, 2015). The user may
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accept the default assumptions regarding inflation, length of cycle, and cyclic variation,
or alter them at model runtime to correspond with economic scenarios she wishes to
assess. It is important to note that the milk price projections generated by the DFTABM
economic projection engine assume under baseline conditions the continuation of federal
milk price subsidies, which have tended to artificially deflate milk prices. Parameters
should be adjusted at model runtime if the user wishes to assess scenarios in which these
subsidies are discontinued.
Feed Cost Projections
The feed cost projection engine in the model works in a similar way to the milk
price projection engine. Once again, a compounding interest formula sets a baseline
price according to historic rates of inflation: by default, this value is set to 2% annually.
Feed cost has historically varied annually with surpluses or shortages in agricultural
production of feed grains. A variability of 5% per year is the default assumption for feed
cost (Gould, 2015a). Once again, the user may alter these values at runtime to assess the
impacts of alternate economic scenarios on model outcomes. Since organic and
conventional feed costs tend to fluctuate simultaneously, the model calculates organic
feed in relation to conventional. Similarly to milk price, a +/- 2% monthly stochastic
variation is factored into the final feed cost. Feed cost is initially generated in dollars per
CWT of milk, which is the industry reporting standard. The model uses assumptions set
by a global parameter about the average milk production, in CWT, of a cow per month to
generate figures for feed cost per cow per month. These figures are then used to calculate
farm profitability for each DairyFarm agent.
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Farm-Level Profit and Loss Calculations
DairyFarm agents use a cyclically-executing function to calculate their profits and
losses each month. Gross monthly profit is calculated based on the value received for
milk produced. Expenses are subtracted, factoring in economies of scale and the
influence of management practices on expenses. Finally, net monthly profit is calculated
as the difference between gross monthly profit and expenses.
Gross Monthly Profit
Milk production is calculated based on global assumptions about the average
quantity of milk produced per cow monthly. Because larger farms have generally been
found to produce higher volumes of milk on average, the amount of milk produced per
month is defined based on actual observed rates of milk production per cow on various
sized farms, multiplied by the number of milkers. To account for inefficiencies in
production, such as sick animals or those which are not producing optimally, an
additional factor is used to calibrate the “ideal” milk production to the observed actual
milk production on Vermont dairies. If the DairyFarm agent is certified organic, it
receives the organic milk price for each CWT produced, as generated by the model’s
economic projection engine, whereas it receives the conventional price if it is not
certified organic. If the user set the model up to assume a premium price for pasturebased milk, that is also factored in to the gross monthly profit calculation.
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Monthly Expenses
i.

Feed Cost:
Expenses are comprised of feed costs plus other expenses, and are adjusted based

on scale and management techniques. Feed costs are calculated by first establishing the
percent of food that is produced on-farm. First, global parameters for the stocking rate of
both an acre of silage production, and an acre of pasture production, are multiplied by an
agent’s cropland and forage land, respectively, and summed, yielding the number of
animals able to be fed through on-farm production. This is then divided by the number of
milkers, yielding the percent of necessary feed that is able to be produced on a given
agent’s acreage. If the agent is not using rotational grazing, it is assumed to be feeding a
total mixed ration, which requires certain elements, such as protein feeds, vitamins, and
minerals, to be purchased off-farm. The theoretical percentage able to be produced on
farm is reduced by 30% to account for these necessary purchases. The total feed cost per
month is then calculated by multiplying the proportion of feed that must be purchased
off-farm by the feed cost per cow per month, as determined by the model’s economic
forecast engine, and finally by the number of milkers that must be fed. Note that the cost
output by the economic forecast engine differs for organic versus conventional feed.
ii.

Non-Feed Costs:
To simplify the model somewhat, non-feed expenses are not itemized as e.g.

machinery, fertilizer, labor, etc., but rather calculated by multiplying the number of cows
by a set global parameter representing average non-feed expenses per cow as of 2012.
Once again, a compounding interest formula is used to calculate inflation, set at 2% as a
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baseline. Non-feed expenses are assumed to exhibit a +/- 20% stochasticity each month,
since often some months will present relatively few expenses, whereas others will require
the purchase of a new piece of machinery or other large capital investment. It has been
reported that rotational grazing achieves much of its profitability from its lower level of
per-cow expenses; primarily feed, but also including non-feed costs such as infrastructure
and capital expenditures (Conneman et al., 2006). Therefore, agents using rotational
grazing experience a reduction in non-feed expenses per month, defined by a global
parameter set by default to 20%. Likewise, organic farms have been shown to exhibit
higher non-feed costs per month (Wisconsin, 2013), and are therefore adjusted in a
similar manner by a global parameter, set by default to a 15% increase.
Net Revenue, Income, Operating Capital, and Taxes
Net revenue is calculated monthly by subtracting feed and non-feed expenses
from gross sales. The necessary portion of off-farm income in the cases of Retirement
and Off-Farm Occupation farm typologies is used where possible to cover any farm
losses. As long as operating capital is sufficiently high—defined as the total herd
replacement cost—agents withhold up to 85% of net farm earnings as personal income,
and invest any reminder back into the farm as operating capital. Year-to-date figures for
sales, net revenue, income from farm revenue, and off-farm income are calculated. At
the end of each year, these values are used to generate financial numbers for the
preceding year. Taxes are also paid annually according to the prevailing Vermont tax
rate for agricultural land use of $4.999 per acre (Vermont Department of Taxes, 2015).
Going Out of Business
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Each year, a sub-function is executed that determines whether the farm agent is
still financially viable. If an agent is in debt by a quantity that exceeds the value of its
herd, despite having made all available financial adjustments, that farm goes out of
business. It is disconnected from all peers, and subsequently appears on the map as a
small gray dot.
3.3.4. Soil Transport Model
The Dairy Farm Transitions ABM includes a simple soil transport model that
calculates both per-farm and total soil loss resultant from dairy farming activity within
Franklin County. These values are based on the Universal Soil Loss Equation, which
indicates that an acre of row crops typically loses approximately 14 tons of soil to runoff
annually, whereas an acre of permanent pasture typically loses about 2 tons (VDEC,
2006; Stone, 1996). Soil transport was chosen as an indicator of ecological externalities
because where soil runs off, it generally carries nutrients and chemicals with it.
Therefore, the level of soil transport into waterways is positively correlated with nutrient
loading of waterways, the reduction of which is a key agricultural policy aim in Vermont.
3.3.5. Policy Interventions
Three policy interventions are examined in this model. Two policy interventions
are aimed at spurring farmer behavior change by capitalizing on peer networks, and the
third is a direct government payment for reductions in soil loss. The peer network
connectivity interventions do not offer financial incentives or disincentives to the
farmers, but rather examine the way in which simply changing the patterns of interaction
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between farmers may influence their decision-making behavior and ultimately bring
about positive change, both ecologically and financially.
Model Farm
Model farms were commonly established in the 19th century as centers of both
agricultural research and education. Their methods were designed to be replicable or
emulable, and served as learning hubs for the community, in order to enhance overall
agricultural efficiency and productivity (Wade, 2002). The model farm system envisaged
here would provide state funding to turn an existing farm achieving high success into a
temporary model farm for the community. In exchange for this funding, their doors
would be opened, and classes given, so that other farmers could replicate their successes.
If the user indicates the establishment of a county-wide model farm system at
runtime, the Dairy Farm Transitions ABM model farm functionality is activated. For the
purposes of this ABM, the model farm is simply the farm with the highest annual net
revenue of all the farms in the county. If desired by policy aims, the user can stipulate
that the model farm may not exceed a certain size, for example if a policy was primarily
focused on the viability of small or mid-scale operations. Every five years, a function
evaluates all the agents in the county and establishes one farm as the model farm,
indicated with an “M” on the map. This farm is then used as a “model” for all the other
farms in the county. Its production methods and annual revenue are opened to all other
farms. If the model farm functionality is activated, when evaluating other farms to
determine whom they should emulate, agents may use the model farm, in addition to
those farms in their immediate peer network, to base their emulation decisions.
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Farmer Field School
Farmer Field Schools (FFS) are a group-based approach by which to teach best
management and other beneficial practices to farmers at a localized level. They rely on
bottom-up, local knowledge rather than centrally-designed, “one size fits all” messaging,
and often take place at the participants’ own farms. In this way, information may be
shared between farmers concerning techniques that work for specific farm typologies, but
may be glossed over by hegemonic recommendations (Sustainable Agriculture
Information Initiative, 2010). Farmer Field Schools have proven effective in promoting
the adoption of BMPs, most notably the technique of Integrated Pest Management (Feder,
Murgai, & Quizon, 2004; Rebaudo & Dangles, 2013).
If the user indicates the establishment of a Farmer Field School at model runtime,
the ABM’s Farmer Field School functionality is activated. Like the Model Farm, the user
may stipulate that only farms under a certain size are allowed to participate in the field
school, in order to target key farm demographics. The user may also establish the
participation rate in the program. During several months out of each farming season, the
ABM indicates that the field school is in session, and participants are temporarily linked
together based on their participation in this program. During this time, field school
participants may base their emulation decisions on other farmers in the field school
program, in addition to those in their regular peer networks. At the end of the farm
session, the linkages are culled, and they are regenerated with a new set of participants
the following season.
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Soil Loss Reduction Credit
The soil loss reduction credit is an incentive-based policy intervention that relies
upon direct payments to individual farmers corresponding with land use changes that
reduce negative environmental externalities. In this case, the indicator of negative
externalities is soil loss, representative of nutrient and sediment transport into waterways.
The user may elect to establish a soil loss reduction credit program at model runtime.
Soil loss reduction is calculated by first obtaining a baseline soil loss per acre for all
Franklin County dairy farms in the model at the model start date. If a farm’s soil loss per
acre is deemed to be below that value in any given year, the farm is paid annually based
on its reduction in soil loss compared to the baseline. The user may specify the level of
incentive payment, in U.S. dollars, per ton below baseline, at model runtime. Payments
to individual farmers are factored in as a tax credit as part of the model’s annual tax
payment sub-function.
3.3.6. Model Data and Parameters
Fixed Parameters
A number of global parameters are set which are fixed in the model’s code.
Where real-world data was available, these parameters were determined using USDA and
other dairy farm statistics. Other values were generated based on the best estimates of the
modeler, and adjusted during the model calibration process. Table 4 below lists the
model’s fixed parameters, their values, and their sources where applicable.
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Table 4: Fixed Parameters in the Dairy Farm Transitions ABM
Parameter
Value
Source
Average milk production per milker per month, CWT
13.6
McBride & Greene, 2009
Average milk production efficiency (% of optimum)
85%
BE
Average non-feed farm expenses per cow per month
$170
BE
Increase in non-feed expenses for organic farms
15%
Wisconsin, 2013
Reduction in non-feed expenses for grazing farms
20%
Conneman et al., 2006
Stocking rate for silage production, cows per acre
0.5
BE
Stocking rate for pasture forage, cows per acre
0.25
BE
Average price of an acre of agricultural land in Vermont
$3205
USDA NASS, 2012
Average tax rate of an acre of agricultural land in Vermont
$4.999
VT Dept. of Taxes, 2015
Average price of a milking cow in Vermont
$1500
BE
Organic certification costs per acre of corn production
$100
BE
Cost to transition one acre of pasture to corn production
$500
BE
Cost to transition one acre of cropland to pasture
$50
BE
Cost to transition one acre of pasture to rotational grazing
$50
BE
Average row-crop soil loss, tons per acre per year
14
VDEC, 2006; Stone, 1996
Average pasture soil loss, tons per acre per year
2
VDEC, 2006; Stone, 1996
Note: “BE” indicates that the value is a best estimate based on limited data availability.

Runtime-Alterable Parameters
At model runtime, users have control over many model parameters via a setup
screen (see Appendix 2). By adjusting these parameters from baseline assumptions, users
may analyze the way differing peer network, decision making, and economic forecast
assumptions influence future dairy production trends, farm viability, and ecological
indicators. Users may also alter parameters associated with the model’s public policy
interventions. Table 5 below lists all of the parameters over which the user has control at
model runtime. Where applicable, the source of the baseline value is also listed.
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Table 5: Runtime Alterable Parameters in the Dairy Farm Transitions ABM
Parameter
Baseline Value
Source
Peer network initialization
Number of dairy farms in Franklin County
187
USDA NASS, 2012
Peer network connection distance, miles
4
UA
Establish a peer herd size similarity limitation
True
UA
Peer herd size similarity factor
½ to 2
UA
Farmer decision making
Frequency of emulation, years
2
UA
Probability of emulation
25%
UA
Probability of trial-and-error behavior
75%
UA
Economic forecast engine
Annual feed cost inflation
2%
Gould, 2015a
Annual feed cost variance
5%
Gould, 2015a
Annual non-feed cost inflation
2%
BE
Annual milk price inflation
2%
Gould, 2015b
Conventional milk price variance per cycle
18%
Su & Cook, 2015
Organic milk price variance per cycle
5%
Su & Cook, 2015
Length of milk price variance cycle
3 years
Su & Cook, 2015
Price premium for grass-based milk
$0
UA
Policy interventions
Establish model farm
False
UA
Establish model farm size limit
False
UA
Model farm size limit
100
UA
Establish farmer field school
False
UA
Farmer field school participation rate
15%
UA
Establish farmer field school size limit
False
UA
Farmer field school size limit
100
UA
Note: “BE” indicates that the value is a best estimate based on limited data availability. “UA” indicates
that the value is an assumption set by the user to analyze differential model outcomes.

3.3.7. Model Calibration
Model calibration is an essential process in enhancing the predictive validity of an
agent-based model’s forecasts. Calibration of the Dairy Farm Transition ABM was
performed both statically, through the agent initialization function, and dynamically, such
that in the baseline condition model outcomes would match trends projected forward
from historical USDA census of agriculture data. Model calibration work took the form
of both crafting small sub-functions in the agent initialization function and adjusting
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farm-level economic and productivity parameters to bring model behavior in line with
historical trends.
Initialization Function Calibration
The model was first calibrated such that at the default model runtime year, 2012,
model outputs correspond with the latest census of agriculture data, which was also
published in 2012. The census of agriculture assigns farms to one of eight typologies
based on net farm income from operations, as well as whether the farm operator receives
off-farm income (see Table 3 above). The DairyFarm agent initialization function uses
these data to assign agents to one of these typologies based on the frequency each is
observed in Vermont’s agricultural sector. Associated distributions for number of
milkers, overall acreage, land use characteristics such as the amount of acreage that is in
crops versus forage production, and management characteristics such as organic
certification status, are based on these USDA farm typology data. While simply utilizing
these distributions and probabilities “out of the box” yielded a model state at runtime
which roughly corresponded with statistical data on characteristics such as milk
production, profitability, and expenses, some additional parameter adjustment was
required to bring model outputs in further in line with on the ground observations.
Firstly, because the census of agriculture makes mention of the prevalence of
rotational grazing only generally, and not with regard to either dairy farms specifically, or
to specific farm typologies, a sub-function was added to assign agents which, after
preliminary initialization, were deemed to roughly fit the characteristics of rotational
grazing farms—namely a small milking herd, and a large reliance on forage, to be
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formally assigned to fit the more technical aspects of grass-based dairying, namely a
forage acreage at least equal to 85% of their total acreage, and milking herd sufficiently
small to receive at least 85% of its dry matter intake from the production level associated
with their forage acreage. This yields an overall rotational grazing prevalence
approximately equal to the observed prevalence of between 12% and 15% (Winsten,
Parsons, & Hanson, 2000; Parsons, 2003; Winsten et al, 2011).
Secondly, after preliminary initialization, it was realized that organic certification
was underrepresented in the model output, especially as concerns medium-sized and
small dairy farms (USDA NASS, 2012c). Therefore, another sub-function was included
which assigns an additional 5% probability that farms under 500 milkers will be certified
organic.
Thirdly, it was realized that the average total acreage per farm—253 acres, as of
2012—was overrepresented by the model’s initialization function prior to calibration
(USDA NASS, 2012c). However, the distribution of acreages across farm typologies, as
well as the distribution of land uses, were properly generated. In order to account for the
distribution, as well as the acreage of land in each use, all initialized acreages are
multiplied by a stochastically-generated factor between 25% and 50%. This calibration
yields both the proper acreage, as well as the proper land use distribution, at model
runtime.
Finally, after preliminary initialization, the proportion of farms with under 200
milkers was found to be underrepresented (USDA NASS, 2012b). Therefore, another
sub-function was created to assign farms preliminarily initialized with between 200 and
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275 cows in their milking herds to be reduced in number by 75. To maintain and hone
the average number of milkers per farm as of 2012, which is 187 (USDA NASS, 2012c),
the number of milkers per farm at preliminary initialization was increased by all farms by
25%. This calibration adjustment yields both the proper average number of milkers per
herd, as well as the proper distribution of farms with under 200 head, at model runtime.
Dynamic Calibration
Once the model is running, three factors influence farm-level outcomes, and each
needed to be calibrated to match model predictions in the baseline condition with
historical data trends as the model progresses. These factors are the model’s economic
forecasting engine, the agents’ decision making, and the farm-level economic model that
determines production, costs, revenue, and income. To perform these calibrations, the
model was set to its standard start date of January 1st, 2012, and programmed to end on
January 1st, 2051. Model outcomes over this 50 year period were then used to calibrate
the model dynamically.
The model’s economic forecasting engine requires little calibration, as it relies
purely on historical trend data to make its predictions. Baselines for inflation rates and
cyclic variances of milk prices and feed costs were available in the literature (Su & Cook,
2015; Gould, 2015a; 2015b). The baseline assumptions of the model’s economic
forecasting engine could therefore be confidently programmed based on these data. The
user may alter these baseline values if desired based on assumptions he or she may wish
to address concerning future economic trends.
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Likewise, agent decision-making behavior is also based on certain set
information, modulated by user assumptions. For example, we know that farmers use
both trial and error, and emulation, as strategies when making farm management
decisions (Alchian, 1950; Chapter 2). While these values have been calibrated according
to the best estimations of the modeler, it is not feasible based on current knowledge to set
a universally accurate and verifiable rate of emulation, for example, since this is not
easily measured, and does not appear in the literature to date. A primary aim of the Dairy
Farm Transitions ABM is to probe these questions by allowing the user to alter farmer
decision-making assumptions at model runtime in order to examine how peer networking
and emulation behavior may influence decision-making patterns and model outcomes.
The third factor influencing farm-level outcomes—namely, farm-level
economics—was therefore the primary means by which the model was calibrated
dynamically to reflect existing trends under baseline conditions. While much of the data
on dairy production is available in the literature (see Tables 4 and 5 above), some values
had to be generated by fist establishing a best estimation, and then adjusting parameters
until the system behaved according to established trends.
For example, while data on the average milk production per milker per month was
known for various sized operations, upon plugging in these data, the overall county-wide
milk production was somewhat higher than the census data indicate. To calibrate the
theoretical to the observed milk production, a milk production efficiency coefficient was
added, accounting for factors such as animal illness, mismanagement, and other means by
which a farm’s production may be less than optimal. By incrementally adjusting this
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value, and observing the resultant model outcomes, the county-wide milk production, and
by extension the overall milk sales figures, was found to correspond with census data at a
value of 85% of theoretical optimum production.
The other primary parameter that was dynamically calibrated was the value for
average non-feed monthly farm expenses. While certain data do exist to guide this value,
they were not found to be specific enough to accurately calibrate an ABM. For example,
the census of agriculture includes data on farm expenses, but does not specify expense
data for dairy farms alone, which may well have a different level of expenditure.
Another datapoint put non-feed expenses per cow per month at around $205 for organic
production (Wisconsin, 2013), but equivalent data were not forthcoming for conventional
production, which is known to have lower non-feed costs. As a further complicating
factor, reported non-feed costs generally include taxes, whereas the Dairy Farm
Transitions ABM calculates actual taxes annually based on the agents’ acreage. Once
again, the model was dynamically calibrated by adjusting the level of non-feed expenses
until agents’ total annual expenditures were in line with total observed farm expenditures
in Vermont, and the rate of dairy farm attrition in the county corresponded with the
historical trends (USDA NASS, 1997c; 2002c; 2007c; 2012c).
Calibration Verification Experiments
To assess the efficacy of the calibrations discussed above, a series of experiments
was conducted to gauge model outcomes. The key metrics used in the calibration process
were (a) the number of operating dairy farms in Franklin County, (b) the percent of
dairies certified organic, (c) the average number of milkers on a Vermont dairy, (d) the
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percent of farms with over 200 milkers, and (e) the annual average value of milk sales for
a Vermont dairy. Between each calibration procedure, the model was run ten times
consecutively, and outcomes from each trial were averaged. The graphs below show
historical data from the 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, and 2012 USDA censuses of agriculture,
followed by outputs from the final calibrated model projecting forward in five-year
increments to 2047. In the case of the organic certification percentage, USDA NASS
data were not available on organic certification rates of dairy farms specifically, however
recent studies have found the rate of organic dairying in Vermont to be 23% as of 2013
(Wisconsin, 2013). The only other data point that was available on the prevalence of
organic-certified dairy farms in Vermont was a study indicating that in the early 1990s,
there were only two organic dairies in the state (Parsons, 2010). Therefore, while it is
known that rates of organic certification on Vermont dairies have increased greatly over
the past 25 years, the shape of the adoption curve is unknown. For this reason, the
calibration graph for organic production below does not extend backward in time as do
the other dynamic calibration results.
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Figure 8: Number of Franklin County Dairy Farms (USDA NASS, 1997c; 2002c; 2007c;
2012c)

Figure 9: Percent of Vermont Dairy Farms Certified Organic (Wisconsin, 2013)
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Figure 10: Average Number of Milkers on Franklin County Dairy Farms (USDA NASS,
1997c; 2002c; 2007c; 2012c)

Figure 11: Percent of Vermont Dairy Farms with 200 or More Milkers (USDA NASS,
1992b; 1997b; 2002b; 2007b; 2012b)
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Figure 12: Average Annual Value of Milk Sales, all Vermont Dairy Farms (USDA
NASS, 1992a; 1997a; 2002a; 2007a; 2012a)

“The Hollowing Out of the Middle”
An additional trend that was observed during model calibration is what has been
called “the hollowing out of the middle”, whereby agricultural production is increasingly
becoming bifurcated into large-scale production operations, and smaller, “lifestyle” farms
(Hicks, 2014). To examine whether this trend is borne out in the predictions of the Dairy
Farm Transitions model, the number of DairyFarm agents, grouped by the size of their
milking herds, was examined under baseline conditions. Agents were divided into three
groups: under 100 milkers; 100 to 599 milkers; and 600 or more milkers. Once again, the
calibration verification experiment consisted of averages from ten consecutive model
runs under baseline assumptions. Figure 13 shows the model outcome, confirming that,
indeed, the model accurately forecasts this trend.
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Figure 13: Number of Dairy Farms in Franklin County by Size of Milking Herd:
DFTABM Output under Baseline Condition

Resiliency as a Function of Farm Scale and Management Techniques
Another interesting preliminary finding observed during the calibration process
concerns the resiliency of the model’s DairyFarm agents. Watching the data as the model
runs, it quickly becomes clear that whenever a cost-price squeeze is generated by the
model’s economic forecasting engine, primarily driven by cyclic variations in the farmgate milk price, the average net revenue that year will plummet, frequently resulting in
average net losses at the end of that year. This phenomenon has been frequently noted in
the literature, and only seems to be increasing in prevalence and severity (Su & Cook,
2015; Parsons, 2010; Thraen & McNew, 2007). Observing the model’s statistical output,
one notices that medium and large farms—those with over 200 milkers—are most
heavily affected by these cost-price squeeze events. Observing the model map, it is
common to see a handful of farms sell off assets and ultimately go out of business within
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about a year following these events. Generally, it is the mid-sized farms that are most
negatively affected. Zooming in to the agent level, it becomes clear that the reason for
this is that large scale farms have built up sufficient operating capital to “weather the
storm” during the bad years. The mid-scale farms, by contrast, often do not have
sufficient resources to stay in business. Small-scale DairyFarm agents do not succumb to
cost-price squeeze events at the same rate as mid or large-scale agents, because (a), they
are more likely to have off-farm income, and (b) they are more likely to be organiccertified and/or using rotational grazing, both of which have resiliency benefits over
conventional dairy production. If the DFTABM is indeed modeling these dynamics
accurately, digging into the mechanisms behind cost-price squeeze events and their
associated farm attrition may prove a fruitful avenue of future research, as it could target
leverage points by which medium-scale farm viability, in particular, may be addressed.

3.4. Experiment Setup
The primary aim of the Dairy Farm Transitions ABM is to analyze the effects of
policies which may increase peer-to-peer learning upon both dairy farm viability and
environmental conservation. Four indicators were established to evaluate the
relationships between a series of nine model setup scenarios and model outcomes. Under
each setup condition, results from a series of ten model runs were exported to a
spreadsheet, where they were averaged across runs. All indicator values in the analysis
below are based on these ten-run averages. For each setup scenario, the model was set to
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begin in 2012 and end in 2047, recording data every five years to correspond with USDA
Census of Agriculture publication dates.
3.4.1. Economic and Ecological Indicators
The indicators chosen to measure the performance of the system are divided into
two broad categories. The first two indicators address farm viability, and the final two
address agricultural land use and its ecological ramifications, specifically regarding the
link between agricultural runoff and nutrient loading of Vermont’s waterways (State of
Vermont, 2014).
Indicator 1: Number Dairy Farms in Franklin County at Model Termination
Attrition of Vermont’s dairy farms has been a major theme in the industry for at
least the past half-century (Parsons, 2010). If dairy farm viability is to be a serious policy
goal, attrition must be examined and addressed. This analysis uses the number of dairy
farms still operating in Franklin County at the conclusion of the experiment, the year
2047, as the primary indicator of farm attrition. Additionally, farms are segmented into
three size groups (under 100 milkers; 100 to 599 milkers; and 600 or more milkers) in
order to gain a finer-grained understanding of the characteristics of dairy farm attrition
under each setup condition.
Indicator 2: Average Annual Net Revenue
The second indicator of farm viability used in this analysis addresses farm
profitability. Specifically, the model outputs the average net annual revenue of the dairy
farms operating in Franklin County in a given year. Because another major policy goal
related to farm viability is the viability of small farms, the numbers are divided into two
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categories: farms with over 600 milkers, and farms with under 100 milkers. The
relationship between these two numbers tells us something about which specific
typologies of farms a given set of setup condition affects. Note that, by today’s
standards, profitability values may appear high. This is because the model accounts for
inflation, and inflation affects revenue just as it does input costs.
Indicator 3: Rates of Organic Certification and Rotational Grazing
The third indicator output by the model concerns land use and farm management.
Specifically, two management techniques were addressed, due to their known impacts on
ecological externalities and farm viability: organic certification and the use of rotational
grazing. By examining how these rates are affected by setup conditions, we may explore
the connections between peer-to-peer connectivity, incentivization, and adoption of these
techniques.
Indicator 4: Soil Loss
The fourth indicator is a direct measure of the effect of setup conditions on
ecological outcomes. As discussed above, soil loss was chosen due to its close ties with
nutrient loading of waterways. Soil loss as a result of dairy farming activities is
calculated both at a county-wide level, and in relation to a number of other factors. This
finer-grained approach is necessary because of the inherent positive correlation between
farm attrition and reduction in soil loss. At first glance, lower total soil loss may be
viewed as inherently positive, but this is not necessarily so if it entails a drastic reduction
in the number of farms still in business. Indicators of farm viability must therefore be
weighed against indicators of ecological impact with a critical eye. For this reason, in
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addition to total soil loss at the county level, three other indicators of soil loss are used in
this analysis: soil loss per farm; soil loss per acre; and soil loss per CWT of milk
produced. By examining this broad spectrum of soil-loss indicators, we may better
understand the interrelationships between farm viability, farm management techniques,
and agricultural land use; and the effect each setup condition has on these outcomes. To
facilitate easy comparison between the evaluated scenarios, soil loss data are reported
below as a change from the 2017 baseline value.
3.4.2. Treatment Scenarios
In addition to the baseline control treatment, eight other treatments were analyzed.
Broadly speaking, these treatments vary according to three basic categories: the level of
peer-to-peer connectivity; the frequency with which agents emulate their peers; and the
presence or absence of a soil loss reduction tax credit. All parameters were left at
baseline levels in each treatment with the exception of those indicated by the following
descriptions.
Level of Peer-to-Peer Connectivity
General Connectivity
The level of generalized peer to peer connectivity is varied by simply altering the
peer network connection distance at runtime. While the model operationalizes
connectivity based on distance, in reality, spatially-disparate networks may exist.
However, at a conceptual level, increasing the model’s connectivity distance may be
conceived as simply increasing the average number of peers to whom each agent is
connected. Two general connectivity scenarios were analyzed here: a baseline
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connectivity scenario, in which the peer network connection distance is 4 miles; and a
high-connectivity scenario, in which the peer network connection distance is increased to
20 miles.
Targeted Connectivity
Targeted connectivity is focused specifically on connecting small farms to one
another. Targeted connectivity treatments are operationalized using both the model farm
and the farmer field school functionality. Whereas neither of these are enabled in the
baseline treatment, in high targeted connectivity treatments, both are enabled. Size limits
of 150 milkers are placed on both model farm selection and eligibility to participate in the
farmer field school. Under this scenario, all farms under 150 milkers participate annually
in the farmer field school. Farms participating in the field school may use one another as
potential emulable peers. All farms may use the model farm as an emulable example,
provided they meet the baseline herd size similarity requirement.
Level of Peer Emulation
Assumptions concerning the level of peer emulation are operationalized by
altering both the emulation frequency, and the emulation probability. To compensate, in
high emulation treatments, the level of trial-and-error behavior is reduced. Three
emulation scenarios were used in this analysis. In the baseline scenario, 25% of agents
choose to emulate a better-performing peer once every two years, and 50% use trial-anderror each year. In the medium emulation treatments, 50% of agents choose to emulate a
better-performing peer once every two years, and 25% of agents use trial-and-error each
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year. In the high emulation treatments, 75% of agents choose to emulate a betterperforming peer each year, and 25% of agents use trial and error each year.
Soil Loss Reduction Credit
Whereas in the baseline scenario, the soil loss reduction credit functionality is
disabled, in the soil loss reduction credit treatments (indicated as “credit” in the outcome
data to follow), a soil loss reduction payment of $25 for each ton of soil a farm keeps out
of waterways (calculated in relation to 2012 baseline soil loss per acre) is issued once per
year as a tax credit.
Scenarios Evaluated
Elements from the three preceding categories were combined into eight distinct
treatments, in addition to a baseline control treatment. Outcomes from these treatments
were then evaluated with regard to the indicators discussed above. The treatments
evaluated are as follows:
1. Baseline
2. Credit Only
3. Medium Emulation Only
4. High Emulation Only
5. High Emulation + Credit
6. High Emulation + High General Connectivity
7. High Emulation + High General Connectivity + Credit
8. High Emulation + High Targeted Connectivity
9. High Emulation + High Targeted Connectivity + Credit
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3.5. Experiment Results
The following graphs show the model’s output under each of the treatment
conditions described above. Figure 14 pertains to indicator 1, Figure 15 to indicator 2,
Figure 16 to indicator 3, and Figures 17-20 to indicator 4. Implications of these results
are discussed in the Conclusions section below.

Figure 14: Number of Dairy Farms in Franklin County at 2047 Model Termination
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Figure 15: Annual Net Revenue of Farms with 600 or More Milkers and Farms with
Under 100 Milkers, Average 2012 through 2047

Figure 16: Rates of Organic Certification and Rotational Grazing at 2047 Model
Termination
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Figure 17: Annual Total Soil Loss, Franklin County, Average 2012 through 2047

Figure 18: Annual Soil Loss per Farm, Average 2012 through 2047
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Figure 19: Annual Soil Loss per Acre, Franklin County, Average 2012 through 2047

Figure 20: Soil Loss per CWT of Milk Produced, Franklin County, Average 2012
through 2047
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3.6. Conclusions
3.6.1. Analysis by Indicator
Indicator 1: Number of Dairy Farms in Franklin County at Model Termination
Under the baseline treatment, dairy farm attrition reached its highest rate, with an
average of only 69.7 farms left standing at the end of the model runs (Figure 14).
Interestingly, the lowest rate of attrition was achieved under the High Emulation + Credit
treatment, in which an average of 78.9 farms were still in business in 2047. This
indicates that perhaps a smaller peer network may have certain advantages over networks
of higher degree, provided farmers readily capitalize on the experiences of their peers.
Indeed, observing agent behavior on the model’s main screen map, it is common to see
tightly-connected, localized groups of farms learn from one another readily, ultimately
adapting their farm management practices until many achieve a sustainable model of
profitability. If an agent were getting mixed signals from a larger, and perhaps more
heterogeneous peer group, it may succumb to rising economic cost-price squeeze
pressures before it is able to adapt.
Whereas the High Emulation + Credit treatment seems to have exacerbated or at
least continued the trend of “hollowing out the middle,” the treatments with the lowest
attrition amongst mid-sized farms were the two High Targeted Connectivity treatments.
One possible explanation for this is that the targeted connectivity initially helped small
farms to find a sustainable balance leading to steady profitability. This may have been
driven by their widespread use of management methods like organic certification and
rotational grazing, which can bolster profitability and resiliency on smaller-scale farms.
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If these small scale farms found success, they may have incrementally grown into
successful mid-scale farms. This analysis suggests that one way to solve the “hollowing
out of the middle” problem is to give smaller farms the opportunity to thrive and grow.
Despite the minor differences discussed in the preceding paragraphs, a key
takeaway from these dairy farm attrition data is that, no matter what the policy
intervention, a good deal of dairy farm attrition is bound to take place. This inconvenient
truth is a product of the inherent economic realities of dairy farming, which are only
becoming more challenging as margins narrow and, crucially, as fluctuations in the farmgate milk price lead to periodic cost-price squeezes, as will be discussed in the resiliency
section below.
Indicator 2: Average Annual Net Revenue
Whereas rate of attrition is a valuable overall indicator of farm viability,
examining farm profitability provides a closer look at what’s going on behind the scenes,
revealing some of the nonlinearities and interdependencies at play in such a complex
system. Model outputs show that the highest average profitability for large farms was
achieved under the Medium Emulation Only treatment (Figure 15). It would appear that,
because increasing herd size and purchasing more land are prominent features of the
model’s trial-and-error function, for farms that draw their profitability largely from scale,
a certain degree of simple “get big or get out” decision-making is beneficial. However,
this is by no means a universal mantra: the baseline treatment, which relies even more
heavily on trial-and-error, and thus on scaling up, yields the lowest level of profitability
for large farms, and the second-lowest for small farms: some adaptation is necessary.
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Interestingly, while the High Emulation Only treatment increases per-farm
revenue for small farms over the Medium-Emulation Only treatment, it decreases the
average revenue for large farms. Thus, it would appear that the relationship between
emulation frequency and farm profitability, all else being equal, may peak at a certain
point, and that this point is higher (more emulation) for smaller farms, and lower (more
simple increase of scale) for larger operations. The precise point of this peak for both
large and small farms is an area for future study.
For small farms, the highest level of profitability was achieved under the High
Emulation + High General Connectivity + Credit treatment. Overall, as noted above, for
small farms, the highest average profitability was consistently achieved in treatments
which included high emulation, to the extent that, for small farms, no treatment without
the High Emulation scenario outperformed any which did include it. These results
suggest that emulating peers to achieve a financially-balanced management style is
critical for small farm viability.
As echoed in the preceding section, the effect of high connectivity on profitability
is less clear. Increasing the number of connections in a general sense appears in some
contexts to actually slightly reduce average profitability. However, increasing
connectivity selectively, as is done in the High Targeted Connectivity scenario, does
appear to enhance small farm profitability. This result may be due to the effect of too
much heterophily, which has been hypothesized to inhibit diffusion of innovation in
certain contexts (Rogers, 2010). This may be explained by considering the case of
multiple equilibria, in which two peers are profitable to a similar degree, yet each of
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which draws its profitability from opposing management styles. A peer may become
caught in the middle, adjusting first one way, and then the other, and never arriving at
one of the equilibria. If a network is smaller and more homogenous, it is more likely that
an agent will simply incrementally emulate a single highly-profitable peer, eventually
arriving at a similar sustainably-profitable management style.
In general, the Soil Loss Reduction Credit scenario also positively impacted small
farms over corresponding treatments which did not include the credit, probably because
small farms are more likely to be grass-based, and thus are more likely to receive a
payment. The credit had more ambiguous effects on large farms, sometimes increasing
profitability, while other times decreasing it. The seeming ambiguity in these data
suggests that the establishment of a credit for reducing environmental externalities may
exhibit complex interactions with other factors, and ultimately these nonlinearities may
make predicting the effects of such a scheme difficult or impossible. For example, it may
be the case that payments to farmers to reduce environmental externalities simply enable
them to grow larger, ultimately having the opposite of the intended effect. This
mechanism is another rich area for further study.
Indicator 3: Rates of Organic Certification and Rotational Grazing
In all treatments, the model predicts a sizable rise in the prevalence of both
organically-certified dairy farms and farms using rotational grazing (Figure 16).
Tracking the agents as the model runs, it becomes clear that this is largely due to the
inherent increase in resilience associated with these methods. In the case of organic
production, this resilience is primarily driven by the relatively-lower fluctuations in farm128

gate milk prices, which tended to wipe out many conventional operations, especially the
mid-scale farms. Thus, despite both higher feed costs, higher non-feed costs, lower milk
production, and the price or organic certification, organic farms in the model tended to
last. Their peak profitability was not as high as their conventional counterparts, but they
were resilient.
Similarly, while they achieved only modest levels of overall profitability,
rotational grazing farms often had the highest levels of per-cow profitability, a
phenomenon that has often been noted in the literature (Kriegl, 2005; Benson, 2009).
These per-cow profits were driven by lower costs, both feed and non-feed. Thus,
rotational grazing farms were generally not as susceptible to the “cost” part of the costprice squeezes, and were more resilient as a result.
The prevalence of organic certification consistently peaked at between 40% and
48%, and did not seem to be strongly affected by the treatments assessed here. However,
the High Emulation treatments consistently facilitated higher levels of rotational grazing
adoption, with the High Emulation + High General Connectivity + Credit treatment
achieving the highest level of adoption, at 35.4%. Since rotational grazing is a technique
used primarily by small farms, and we have already seen that High Emulation treatments
correlate with small farm viability, these results are not surprising.
Indicator 4: Soil Loss
In general, soil loss outcomes, as calculated by the Universal Soil Loss Equation,
exhibited relatively high sensitivity to the treatments assessed. Under the baseline
treatment, total soil loss dropped from about 470 tons per year to about 365 tons per year,
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a decrease of 105 tons annually (Figure 17). This result is not surprising, as it is driven
primarily by the aforementioned attrition inherent in Vermont’s dairy industry. While
this represents a positive from the standpoint of environmental conservation, as discussed
above, this must be weighed against the parallel goal of maintaining a vibrant dairy farm
economy in the state. The question therefore becomes: which treatment maximizes dairy
farm viability, while simultaneously minimizing the environmental externalities
associated with dairy production?
Examining Figure 17 also reveals that the Credit Only and the Medium Emulation
Only treatments actually increased predicted total soil loss as of 2047 over the baseline
treatment. This is perhaps unsurprising, since both of these treatments also decreased
attrition over baseline to some extent (Figure 14), while increasing profitability for large
farms in particular (Figure 15). These treatments also performed poorly on a per-farm,
per-acre, and per CWT basis. These results suggest that an unintended side-effect of
increasing large farm profitability may be to also increase sediment transport,
compounding rather than curtailing Vermont’s water quality woes. The probable
mechanism here is that increased profitability of large operations facilitates their capacity
to increase scale to an even greater degree. Since these farms generally produce large
acreages of silage crops, with high associated soil loss, an increase in their average size
will naturally tend to increase overall soil loss.
If the treatments that primarily promote the profitability of large farms may
actually exacerbate soil loss, what about the treatments that enhance the viability of small
and medium-sized farms? Is it possible to both decrease farm attrition, yet also decrease
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soil loss over baseline? The preceding sections have demonstrated that high rates of
emulation are generally financially beneficial for small farms. It was also shown that
targeted connectivity has advantages for reducing attrition among mid-scale producers,
and for enhancing profitability among small-scale producers. Further, it was suggested
that the two may be intertwined, as high profitability on small-scale farms may enable
them to grow into mid-scale farms. Examining the soil loss results on a per-cow, peracre, and per CWT basis, we see that the treatments which generally yield the most
reduction in soil loss are those that include the Targeted Connectivity scenario, in
addition to the High Emulation scenario (Figures 18-20).
Perhaps the most important of the soil loss data presented here is soil loss per
farm (Figure 18). Low per-farm soil loss means more farms can exist on the landscape
given a set Total Maximum Daily Load. It is this statistic, more than any other, which
joins the parallel goals of minimizing attrition, enhancing profitability, and limiting
environmental externalities. The first striking realization is that the six treatments with
the best performance all include the High Emulation scenario. Coupled with the farm
profitability analysis above, which indicates that the High Emulation scenario also
bolsters small-farm profitability, it may be generally concluded that efforts to increase
emulation-based decision-making, especially among Vermont’s small and mid-sized
dairy operators, may be a valuable means by which to positively influence both dairy
farm viability and ecological stewardship.
Examining the curves for the High Emulation + High Targeted Connectivity
treatments, which yield the lowest average soil loss per farm at the end of the model runs,
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one thing becomes immediately apparent: change takes time. In every treatment, the
average soil tonnage lost per farm increases to some extent, probably a continuation of
the historical growth in average dairy farm size. It is only after agents begin to establish
more-sustainable production methods, both economically and ecologically, that the curve
begins to bend, ultimately reducing soil losses by over a ton per farm per year over the
baseline treatment. Yet, unlike some of the other treatments, this ecological success does
not come at a cost to farm viability. The High Emulation + High Targeted Connectivity
treatments come in slightly below the middle of the pack for overall soil loss in Franklin
County, but this is because they offer some of the lowest levels of attrition of any
treatment, especially where small and medium-sized farms—Vermont’s most vulnerable
farm populations—are concerned.
3.6.2. Limitations of the Model
One of the benefits of computer simulations as research tools is that they may
undergo revisions and further development in order to enhance both their functionality
and their predictive validity. With this in mind, the current version of the DFTABM may
aptly be described as a “beta release.” While much care was taken to make the model as
accurate as was feasible by a single modeler in a set timeframe, the model and
corresponding experiments described in this chapter do have a number of limitations.
Firstly, while real-world data was utilized to a large extent in model
parameterization, a significant number of best estimates were required to develop a
functional economic forecasting engine and farm-level profit and loss calculation
function (see Tables 4 and 5). In future iterations of the DFTABM, the accuracy of these
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estimates should be further verified and enhanced through additional consultation with
dairy industry experts. By viewing the predictions of the current version of the model,
such experts may offer suggestions upon which to base revisions to these functions.
A second, similar limitation concerns assumptions about farm management
decision-making, as encoded in the DairyFarm agent statechart. While a certain amount
of direct farmer input was solicited and utilized to encode agent decision heuristics (see
Chapter 1, section 1.4.2), in the current version of the model, heuristics were also inferred
from macro-level trends in the industry, and sanity-checked based solely on the
experiences and assumptions of the modeler. For example, while the general propensity
for farms to increase in average size is a robust data-driven observation, the precise
actions farmers may take to effect those results—for example, the average number of
milkers a farm would reasonably add in any given year—were largely based on the
necessity to calibrate the model to fit macro-level data trends. Similar agent decision
heuristic assumptions include the degree to which a farmer may alter his land-use in any
given year, and the frequency with which farmers may alter their production methods
based on trial-and-error versus peer emulation. To enhance the precision of such agentlevel heuristics, farmers would need to be consulted in greater depth, for example through
a survey instrument, or by conducting additional interviews during which the DFTABM
may be further ground-truthed.
Thirdly, the current version of the model includes only a rudimentary soil
transport model. In reality, many more factors go into determining levels of runoff from
any given farm site. These factors include soil type; the grade of fields; proximity to
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waterways; and the use of other BMPs not currently simulated by the DFTABM such as
buffer strips, field rotation, manure injection, or cover-cropping. Additionally, an explicit
model of phosphorus transport, which accounts for both sediment-bound P and soluble P
runoff, would add a great deal of value to a model which is intended in part to address
phosphorus loading of waterways. The “phosphorus index” is a farm planning tool which
may aid implementation of a phosphorus transport sub-model within the DFTABM.
Implementation should be conducted in close coordination with experts in soil science,
and ideally calibrated to include the impacts of the BMPs discussed above.
Fourthly—in order to allow for comparisons between existing agri-environmental
policies, policies currently being proposed by industry experts, and experimental peerbased policies—additional experimental treatments should be run. For example, some
dairy farm economists advocate eliminating existing milk subsidies in order to correct
macroeconomic imbalances in the industry, leading to higher farm-gate milk prices and
ideally increasing farm profitability. Scenarios could also be evaluated which reflect
current agri-environmental policy strategies such as increased use of cost-sharing
programs and stricter enforcement of Vermont’s Accepted Agricultural Practice (AAP)
regulations (see Chapter 1, section 1.3.5).
A fifth limitation concerns the structure of farmer networks generated by the
model. In its current iteration, the model assumes a simple distance-based peer network
among farmers, modulated by a consideration of farm size similarity. However, in
reality, farmer peer networks are likely based on other factors such as ideological
similarity, similarity of production methods, and kinship, in addition to distance and farm
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size. The inclusion of more complex network connectivity algorithms would likely lead
to more homophilic baseline peer networks, predicated upon the voluntary selection of
peer connections observed in the real world. In order to ascertain data pursuant to more
accurate farmer peer network models, additional survey research would likely have to be
conducted.
Finally, the model experiments described here represent only one kind of
experiment that can be run using an agent-based model, and the simplest kind, at that.
While the model was run multiple times for each treatment, and the results averaged
across runs, a more formal process of sensitivity analysis would ensure that the model
results are robust and that no single model parameter causes undue uncertainty in the
experimental results. Secondly, parameter variation experiments should be conducted in
order to assess the impact of altering individual parameters in narrow increments across a
wider range. Parameter variation would allow for an experiment which, for example,
determined more precisely the level of network homophily which produces the best peer
learning dynamics. Such an experiment would likely prove valuable to both network
theorists and practitioners. Due to limitations of the software used to run the experiments
presented in this paper, neither formal sensitivity analysis nor parameter variation
experimentation were possible, necessitating the use of the somewhat more rudimentary
experimental methods described above.
3.6.3. Final Remarks
Overall, although the results presented here are complex, and there are still many
lessons to be learned by creating new versions of the software, further calibrating the
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model, and analyzing new scenarios, a few overarching themes emerge. First of all, it
has been demonstrated that the performance-based incentives like the Soil Loss
Reduction Credit may have ambiguous effects due to the difficult-to-predict
nonlinearities that emerge. For example, inclusion of the credit on top of high
connectivity and emulation scenarios slightly increased per-farm soil loss, while slightly
decreasing per-acre soil loss. It also generally improved small-farm profitability, but may
have negatively impacted large-farm profitability. And perhaps most crucially,
implementing the credit program in the absence of other interventions actually increased
total soil loss over baseline conditions. Given that the cost of the Soil Loss Reduction
Credit program in these model runs was often in excess of $1.5 million per year, in this
context, at least, it would appear that such direct performance-based subsidy programs
probably do not represent the best use of state funding.
Secondly, this study concludes that enhancement of peer-to-peer learning among
smaller farmers, and encouragement of emulation between peer farmers, may represent a
valuable leverage point to bend the curves of both dairy farm attrition and mitigation of
agricultural runoff in the right direction. Emergent self-organization resulting from the
peer-to-peer learning of DairyFarm agents in the DFTABM can be clearly seen on the
map as the model runs. Much like in the real world, multiple equilibria appear to exist
under which farms can achieve sustainable profitability. In the DFTABM, this often
takes the form of (a) scaling up, (b) maintaining a mid/large scale, but certifying organic,
or (c) remaining small and adopting rotational grazing. In general, after the simulation
runs for about 20 years, the majority of agents that have not succumbed to economic
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pressures fall into one of these three “equilibrium” categories. Additional selforganization in the model manifests itself through the structure of the embedded peer
network. Since the default network typology in the DFTABM is distance-based, often,
pockets of spatially-neighboring farms will arise which all trend toward one of the three
equilibria listed above, each learning from the others until all have achieved a sustainable
equilibrium, a case of “a rising tide floats all boats.” This effect is especially apparent
when economic assumptions are set such that cost-price squeeze events are especially
severe; agents must quickly adapt to their environment if they are to survive. Qualitative
evidence suggests that peer learning plays a large role in many farmers’ decisions to
adopt grass-based dairy farming (see section 3.3.2). Research also shows that peer-based
solutions like grazing networks, model farm programs, and farmer field schools can
stimulate the diffusion of beneficial innovations (Wade, 2002; Feder, Murgai, & Quizon,
2004; Rebaudo & Dangles, 2013). The DFTABM begins to build up the theoretical
foundations underlying these qualitative observations, lending evidence to support the
validity of peer-based policies as an avenue for positive change.
By harnessing and leveraging the nexuses where farmer self-interest intersects
state ecological interests, and then working to spread knowledge of those solutions—
either through existing networks, or by working to build new networks—both attrition
and ecological externalities may be reduced. Of prime importance is that, unlike
incentive and regulatory-based policies, there are no direct payments to participants, and
no cost of enforcement associated with peer-based programs, yet they may be just as
effective. The DFTABM demonstrates the truism that, all else being equal, agricultural
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runoff will be reduced if farms simply go out of business, as many of them might if harsh
fee-based regulatory policies are enacted. However, the consequences of that result will
likely have implications for rural communities and the tourist dollars that are generated
by a flourishing working landscape. It is also important to consider that if farmers sell
off land, and that land is eventually developed, water quality may ultimately take an even
bigger hit. On the other hand, encouraging a deliberate process of adaptation may allow
Vermont to “have its cake and eat it too,” spurring a proliferation of sustainablyprofitable dairy farms while also meeting water quality goals.
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